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Abstract ; This report describes the work done to date on the
first year of a three year project designed to upgrade the
education of military officers in the field of strategic planning
and management. The initial section of the report covers the
genesis of the project, the thesis of the research, and the use
of the terms "strategic management" and "strategic planning."
The second section of the report summarizes some of the current
conditions within DoD that make application of strategic
management/planning difficult. The final section of the report
outlines the reform efforts of the faculty of the Naval
Postgraduate School to respond to the current conditions and
to initiate curriculum change. Efforts to date have involved the
overhaul of two capstone seminars and the writing of student
reports, which will be eventually turned into case studies in
strategic planning and strategic management. Planned actions
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In military organizations planning is a finely tuned art if
not a well developed science. Each major organization in the
military establishment has planning sub organizations. Some
indulge in "wish list" planning, some are involved with long-
range planning, some concern themselves with the near-term
planning cycles of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System (PPBS), some with war and campaign planning, and others
with specific weapons systems or types of forces. Still other
planning organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD) include
planning portfolios on mobilization, the industrial base, rules
of engagement, military exercise programs, and crisis responses.
Despite the wide spectrum of these efforts and the human and
material resources devoted to the planning process, we constantly
hear about the need for more thorough and precise planning within
DoD. Whatever planning is currently being envisaged and
developed, however heroic the effort, apparently is viewed as
unsatisfactory. We have, it would seem, a major "planning gap."
During the last nine months, Associate Professors Nancy
Roberts and James Tritten of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
have embarked on a project for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Net Assessment (OSD/NA) . This project has subsequently
received the endorsement and sponsorship of the National Security
Council (NSC) Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Competitive Strategies and the Strategic Planning Branches.
The project began with conversations Associate Professor
Tritten had with the Director, Net Assessment in 1986, prior to
Professor Tritten' s transfer from OSD/NA to NPS. This
conversation dealt with: (1) what textbooks were being used for
the teaching strategic planning, (2) the fact that existing
texts and journal articles were oriented toward military
strategy, strategic nuclear, or bureaucratic politics within the
defense establishment, (3) a desire to involve the school with a
grass-roots effort to upgrade strategic planning by creating a
center of excellence that would be dedicated to teaching more
than what is traditionally found at civilian (and even military
schools), and (4) a conscious effort to look at business schools
models of strategic planning and see what could be adapted for
the DoD.
Eventually a concept for a three year project unfolded.
This project, entitled "Strategic Management for the Defense
Department" is an effort to improve both strategic planning and
strategic management in the DoD by a reform movement centered
around the education of military officers who have been earmarked
to become professional strategic planners. This interim
technical report will outline the basic problem (as it is viewed
by the investigators), efforts to date, and a plan of action for
the next two years. This interim report is being distributed to
a wide audience of parties known to be interested in military
strategic planning in the hopes that readers will comment on what
they see.
The Concepts of Strategic Management and Long-Range
Planning :
What we have termed as the "planning gap" is difficult to
describe. What exactly is missing from our planning systems that
provokes calls for more or better planning? One view, and the
one we present in this report, is that the planning gap
represents a lack of coordinated effort to integrate DoD's major
goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It
is the lack of a mechanism to marshal and then allocate DoD's
resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative
internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in
the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents.
What is missing is not long-range planning, nor is it the "silent
P" of PPBS, but the planning that integrates DoD's disparate
internal units into a coherent entity.
To begin the dialogue, we would like to first introduce our
definition of "strategic management," since most military
planners are more comfortable with the term "long-range planning"
and may not have ever used the term "strategic management."
Strategic management integrates an organization's major
goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It
marshals and allocates an organization's resources into a unique
and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies
and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and
contingent moves by intelligent opponents (An adaptation from
Quinn, 1980--for full citations, see bibliography).
Strategic management is concerned with the management of the
whole enterprise, not just its functional components or its sub
parts. It becomes the challenge of the organizational leader
(referred to as the general manager in business and industry) to
combine and direct the efforts and activities of the other
members of the organization toward the successful completion of a
stated mission or purpose.
In comparison to other types of planning, strategic
management also analyzes an organization's external environment
and internal climate, and searches for new trends,
discontinuities, surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its
scope is broader than other types of planning, it typically
embodies more qualitative shifts in direction than anticipated
from the long-range planning process. Also guided by an
idealized vision of the future, strategic management tends to be
much more action oriented. The organization attempts to keep its
options open, considering a variety of possible alternatives to
respond promptly to unforeseen contingencies as it moves towar<
its ideal. (Bryson, 1988a, pp. 7-8).
Long-range planning , on the other hand, focuses more 01
specifying goals and objectives and translating them into currenl
budgets and work programs. The objective of long-range planners
(and short-range planners for that matter) is to work backwan
from goals to programs and budgets in order to map out th<
sequence of decisions and actions necessary to achieve th(
desired future which is embodied in the goals. Long-range
planning, as a consequence, assumes that current trends wil!
continue into the future and plans tend to be linear
extrapolations of the present (Bryson, 1988a pp. 7-8).
Paradigm Shifting :
Major changes to strategic planning and the introduction of
strategic management into the DoD would, in addition to improving
the planning process, likely result in a significant shift in the
framework of planners to a new way of addressing problems and
issues. The first order questions, such as "what is the business
and purpose of the DoD," would deserve answers prior to
consideration of second order programming or efficiency issues
that now tend to dominate defense debate. Simply put, it is not
enough for the Secretary of Defense to be only concerned if his
department is well-prepared for a major war.
As a consequence, a paradigm shift could open up planners to
considering issues more fitting the chief executive officer of a
major international organization such as the long-term
competition of nations in the changing international environment,
the economic, political, and cultural aspects of competition, and
the use of the military for other than a major war. Skeptics,
however, argue that the application of business methods to the
DoD has been tried and with disastrous results.
Competition, however, with the Soviets has been going on for
years and will continue indefinitely. The United States simply
cannot afford to continue devoting resources to defense without a
well-thought-out strategy for competing. There is a need to set
positive goals for the military sector of this competition, and
then develop programs to effectively and efficiently achieve
these goals (Roche, 1976).
The changing international environment will likely be more
significant in the next twenty years than it has been in the last
twenty. Planning for long-term competition reguires a 10-20 year
planning horizon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic
options with force structures that were developed out of short-
range planning assumptions. We also cannot afford to indulge
ourselves with "gold-plated" strategies capable of successfully
dealing with all possible contingencies on our own.
By the year 2010, the United States may be a superpower
primarily because of its military power rather than because of
its economic, political, and military power (Kennedy, 1987). The
second major superpower in the world today, the USSR, may have
been eclipsed by the economic (and perhaps political) power of
Japan and China. American access to foreign bases may be
significantly different than that we enjoy today and there will
likely be new threats to face (Ikle & Wohlstetter, 1988).
Thus a fundamental paradigm shift in the way that planners
look at the world could lead to less overall emphasis on the USSR
and Europe (although the central problem for U.S. wartime
strategy will likely remain the USSR and Europe) and a
redirection toward managing day to day competition with other
powers with significantly less capable tools in our kit. Rather
than acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies,
America's future role may be that of "first among equals
(Marshall & Wolf, 1988, p. 18).
The technologies available for the military competition
could improve so dramatically that the fundamental nature of
warfare may change. Superpower competition in military hardware
may shift from the nuclear arena to the non-nuclear. As non-
nuclear weapons become more capable, they may substitute for
nuclear weapons at the tactical, operational, and even the
strategic level. The Soviets have already expressed their
concern over this coming new "revolution in military affairs,"
while we in the United States tend to be more concerned with
managing programs (Marshall & Wolf, 1988).
Thesis
From our observations, interviews, and work in DoD, it is
our contention that the current emphasis in DoD is on planning,
both long and short-range planning, not on strategic management
and not on long-range international and inter-agency issues such
as competition with other nations. For example, the Joint Staff
Officers Guide issued by the Armed Forces Staff College,
describes the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as dealing
with a series of six primary planning documents with direct ties
to PPBS. The military tends to view planning as being either
deliberate or time sensitive, requirements or capabilities
driven, and organized on a global, regional, or functional basis;
not with the strategic management of the total system, however
that system is defined. The bias within the DoD is on military
solutions to what are in reality, political problems requiring
coordinated government-wide solutions.
Evidence of the planning gap can be be found in four major
criticisms of DoD planning: strategic goals and objectives that
lack clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes
mission integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming
needs to the detriment of overall policies and strategies; and
ignoring other agencies, competitors and the external environ-
ment.
Each of the military Services have planning organizations.
Some are associated with programming planning, some with the
planning cycle associated with budgets, some with war and
campaign planning, some with global or specified weapons systems
or types of forces. Yet none, as far as we can ascertain, are
devoted to strategic management of their organizations, as we
have defined the term. None are devoted to a cooperative effort
to successfully manage the DoD or the government as a whole or
address the long-term competition issues addressed above.
We assert that to prepare DoD and the multitude of
organizations it represents for the future, we must go beyond
the narrow bounds of the budget and program cycle and shift the
emphasis to a more comprehensive approach to the management of,
at a minimum, DoD. We believe that comprehensive approach is
best embodied in the principles of strategic management.
The Question
Our first order question, then, is to what extent can we
take the principles of strategic management and apply them to DoD
organizations and military affairs?
Strategic management assumes certain necessary and
sufficient conditions to be effective. Some of the conditions,
but by no means all, are: an agreement on goals and objectives
or at least a mechanism by which the dominant coalition can
develop some consensus on goals and objectives; a process by
which the organization can scan its environment, monitor trends,
and assess its competitors in order for the organization to
assume and an advantageous posture; control over the budget
process which permits a reallocation of resources to fit the
organization's strategy; a management information system which
lays the base for an integrated communication and control system;
and a review and monitoring process to ascertain whether the
current strategies are viable or should be revamped.
To what extent do these conditions obtain in DoD
organizations? While ideally it may be beneficial to
strategically manage DoD, is it practically possible given the
constraints and conditions of the current situation? To what
extent should business methods be applied to the military? It is
to this challenging question that we now turn.
II. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN DOD
DoD Size
A major challenge to the application of strategic management
principles to DoD organizations is the sheer size of the system.
The DoD is a cabinet- level organization within the executive
branch of our federal government. There are twelve major
defense agencies, eight major DoD field activities, the Chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), ten Unified and Specified
combat commands, three (four if you count the Marine Corps)
Military Departments, and thirty-three major officials within OSD
reporting to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). In time of war,
one additional uniformed Service would come under DoD, the Coast
Guard. Over five million active duty, reserve and civilian
employees work directly for and over three million additional
personnel in the private sector provide services or products to
DoD.
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The DoD has some 1265 military installations and properties;
870 in U.S., 375 overseas in 21 countries, and 20 in U.S.
territories. One quarter of all active duty military personnel
are stationed outside of U.S. The FY-88 DoD budget included
$290, 8B budget authority requested and $285. 5B budget outlays
expected; roughly 5.7% GNP, 26.1% of federal outlays or 17% of
net public spending. Also included in DoD's activities are just
under $7B in foreign military sales, $906M in foreign government
grant aids, and $56M in international military training and
education.
By contrast, Exxon, the number 1 Fortune 500 company, has
around 139,000 employees, and has sales only half of DoD outlays.
(Even AT&T at its largest in 1982 had fewer than on million
employees before its breakup)
.
Thus, what all these figures point to is a picture of the
largest and most complex organization in the free world. In the
jargon of business, DoD is a very large multi-national
corporation with an extremely diverse portfolio. How can anyone
or any group strategically manage or even plan for operations for
an enterprise of this size?
If we approach the problem from smaller organizational
units, what is the appropriate organizational level? If we take
the Navy itself, it is still a large organization.
The Department of the Navy (DoN) is a major military
department but one with legacy of once having been a cabinet-
level organization. The Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of
12
Naval Operations have forty-four major organizations reporting to
them including two full military services (increasing to three in
time of war with the transfer of the Coast Guard from the
Department of Transportation)
.
Missions for the DoN include operations in space, in the
air, on the land, at sea, and under the sea. The DoN is tasked
with recruiting and training and eguipping forces during
peacetime and while Allied, Unified, and Specified Commanders
outside of the Navy organization actually do the fighting during
war.
Figure 2 is a line diagram of the Department of the Navy





Thus, we are left with a major dilemma. Even when viewing
the Navy's organizational system, we are confronted with the same
problem of size. As with DoD, the Navy is a multi-national
organization with a diverse portfolio. How can it b.e
strategically managed to form a whole? If we find it difficult
to apply strategic management principles at this level, what is
the appropriate unit or level of analysis?
Deficiencies in DoD Structure and Processes
In addition to the problems of size, other conditions make
application of strategic management in DoD a challenge. Many of
these have been outlined in the staff report to the Senate Armed
Services Committee (Locher, 1985). We will therefore draw freely
from this material to illustrate why some of the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the application of strategic management
principles to DoD and its organizations may be problematic.
1. Limited Planning Integration at* DoD's Policymaking
Level.
The principal organizations of the Washington headquarters
of the DoD are the OSD headed by the SECDEF, the Organization of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) headed by the CJCS, and the
Military Departments headed by a Service Secretary and a career
military officer who also has membership in OJCS. These
Washington organizations are focused primarily on functional
areas. Each agency in the Washington headquarters of DoD
additionally maintains its own duplicate organizations for each
of these functional areas.
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Each Military Department has multiple and separate
headquarters staffs: the Secretariat serving the Service
Secretary and the military headquarters staff supporting the
Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations. This arrangement
resulted in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication
of effort. The existence of separate staffs leads to unnecessary
supervision, delays, micro-management, and inefficiency.
Military Department organization along functional lines makes OSD
micro-management easier. Some of these problems have been solved
by recent reorganization and consolidation. The organization of
Military Departments reflects an earlier era when the Service
Secretaries headed separate, cabinet-level departments which is
no longer the case.
Organization by function serves to inhibit integration of
Service capabilities along coordinated mission lines. This in
turn hinders achieving a primary goal in the formation of the DoD
in 1947; roles and mission integration. Headquarters
organizational activity is focused on functional efficiency, the
management and control of functional activities, and not on
overall politico-military and warfighting missions and
objectives.
Perhaps the best example of the orientation of DoD is that
material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized. Despite the
fact that the DoD exists to maintain and employ the Armed Forces,
including timely and effective actions to ensure the security of
the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its
16
interests, the general focus of its Washington headquarters is
not on war-fighting.
A focus on operational missions, where the Armed Forces may
actually have to compete with an adversary, is lost in the
functional orientation. At the end of a day when military
strategic planning has occurred, it is quite likely that there
has been no mention of the name of another country on the face of
the earth. The focus has more likely been on programs, budgets,
and obstacles.
Corporate-like strategic planning at the major headquarters
for the DoD is inhibited by this absence of an overall
organizational focus on major missions and strategic goals.
Planning is undertaken to support organizational positions vis-a-
vis Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the SECDEF or
his staff, the CJCS or the Joint Staff, or other Services.
Service interests and programming rather than overall strategic
needs play the dominant role in shaping planning decisions.
Tradeoffs between different capabilities or programs of
different Services that can contribute to an overall DoD mission
are seldom made. For example, Air Force officers might find it
difficult to get positive recognition for suggesting that
destruction of enemy targets could be more effectively performed
by Navy missiles than by land-based bombers.
Routine functions that support another Service, especially
those of airlift, sealift, or close air support, which are not
central to a Service's own definition of its missions tend to be
17
neglected. The best example of this is the attention paid to
strategic sealift. Tongue-in-cheek suggestions have been made in
the past that perhaps the Army would be better served by having
its own fleet! In the current Administration's defense,
furnishing the afloat forces for strategic sealift mission has
been recently elevated to one of the Navy's primary missions.
Non-traditional contributions to war-fighting missions
outside the normal area for each Service (e.g., Air Force
contributions to sea control) have not always been pursued.
Interoperability and coordination requirements of forces from the
separate Services, who must be able to operate together, are not
readily identified. Again, to the credit of this Administration,
a great deal of cross-service cooperation has occurred in the
last eight years.
Headquarters organizations have been accused of being not
fully attuned to the operational, especially readiness,
requirements of the Unified, Specified, and Allied commanders
that actually must direct the fight of combat. Despite the
perception that the Service Chiefs or the JCS will direct wars,
and despite the press coverage given to recent crisis management
and the opportunities afforded by modern communications systems,
war-fighting is directed by Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) out in
the field rather than from the Washington headquarters. Until a
more appropriate balance between functional and mission
orientation is given to the Washington headquarters of DoD,
effective mission integration will remain limited.
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2. Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals
Inattention to mission-oriented strategic planning at the
Washington headguarters level has led to a lack of clarity of
DoD's strategic goals. The stated goals are ambiguous and vague
and vary depending whether or not one is doing planning to
support programming or war planning. The general international
goals of United States foreign policy have probably not changed
since World War II. Despite this general consistency in obvious
national goals, there is often a lack of agreement in the
military Services and between the CinCs over what should the
national goals or allocation of forces be during wartime in a
major multi-theater conflict with the USSR. Making the
connection between political goals and military capabilities is
central to sound strategic planning and advise to decision-
makers.
Washington headguarters must be involved in the setting of
national goals in a war. Complicating this matter is that a
future war is likely to be fought through an alliance structure
(i.e. NATO) rather than alone. Washington's role may actually be
in allocating resources to alliance military organizations and
remaining national theater commanders.
In an international organization such as DoD, the clear
articulation overall strategic goals in peacetime or during war
can play an important role in achieving a coordinated allied
effort toward these goals. Clarity of goals can enhance
efficiency and capability.
19
DoD has been criticized widely, and incorrectly, for not
having a strategy. The lack of a strategy is not the problem.
DoD needs to maintain a well-designed and highly interactive
strategic planning process that involves more than just military
capability. We see a need for an integrated strategy, not only
integrated internal to DoD, but integrated in terms of the
entire Executive Branch and all of its attendant offices. A
major problem, however, is how can we achieve this in a system
that was designed to be as decentralized as possible, to avoid
the dangers inherent in centralized authority, especially
centralized military authority?
Another problem with government is that it is an extremely
complex organization with coordination at the headquarters level
being on an ad hoc basis rather than institutionalized. For
example, most people in the business world understand that the
environment they operate in is competitive in nature. One can
make the same case for the international environment; the Soviet
Union as a political actor representing a distinct ideology is in
competition with democratic governments representing capitalism
and free enterprise. Whereas there is no doubt that the Soviets
understand this competition and are actively engaged therein, who
is in charge of the competition at our end?
It is difficult to find coordinated international responses
to Soviet political-military competition. Our project is not
that grand, it is to merely identify the nature of the
international competition at the national level, then to attempt
to understand the role of government in that competitive process,
20
the role of the executive branch within the role of government,
then the role of the Defense Department within that.
While we can learn from business and industry how difficult
it is to do corporate-level strategic management for something as
complex as the modern multi-national corporation, those of us
schooled in the fields of foreign affairs or international
relations still tend to view nations as a single actor; the
United States will do this or that and then the Soviet Union may
respond in the following way. Yet the reality of modern
international affairs is that while government might be off doing
something, businesses may be doing other things that could be 180
degrees out from the position taken by government.
3 . Predominance of Programming and Budgeting
DoD suffers from the predominance in routine organizational
activity of the programming and budgeting phases of the resource
allocation process. This focuses the attention of DoD senior
civilian and military officials on near term issues and inputs
rather than outputs. This has led to insufficient attention to
corporate-type strategic planning, war planning, operation
matters, and execution and implementation of policy decisions.
The Secretary himself, the critical civilian link in the chain of
command, and one of two individuals that constitute the National
Command Authority (NCA), probably pays insufficient attention to
his wartime and other operational responsibilities.
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By looking at the numbers of officers and civilians assigned to
programming functions in the varying Washington headquarters vice
those assigned to war plan type strategy or strategic planning,
the bias can actually be documented. One might argue that in a
war, many of these officers would transfer to allied military
organizations or to the CinCs. It is not self-evident, however,
that the skills of national Service programmers are transferable
to the conduct of allied or joint wars and campaigns; hence even
if this large population of programmers was shifted in time of
war, the necessary experience and background might not be there.
Even within the category of programming, emphasis is
generally given to the purchase of major weapons systems and not
for routine and mundane things required for sustainability for
actual combat operations. Simply put, the "star" performers are
assigned to acquisition of "sexy" new weapons systems and not
bullets and beans. Questions such as mobilization requirements
for long-conventional conflict or civil defense preparations are
generally relegated to second and third level offices.
The overemphasis on programming and the underemphasis of
planning for operational matters are reflected in the
professional development of military officers. The development
of planning and execution skills needed in wartime has been given
relatively low priority in the resource-oriented Services;
technical, managerial and bureaucratic skills being rewarded
instead.
22
We think this imbalance between headquarters staff functions
and Allied/CinC operations is a major difference with industry
where line operations tend to be emphasized and theoretically
have the power to set corporate strategic direction.
4. Imbalance Between Modernization and Readiness
The imbalance between the interests of Washington
headquarters and the CinC's interests is a major cause of the
imbalance between modernization and readiness in the defense
program. Overemphasis on acquiring future capabilities tends to
deprive operating forces of capabilities needed to respond to
today's or tomorrow's crisis. Current warfighting capabilities
and sustainability are robbed to pay for hardware that may (or
may not) prove useful in the distant future. This is similar to
major corporate decisions over how much of the firm's profits
should be directed towards internal research and development and
how much for current operations.
The Services, however, have always thought that if needed,
Congress would appropriate the funds to sail the ships and fly
the planes- -rather than seeing them tied up at anchor or parked
on an airfield. The constituency for readiness is the CinC whose
interests have been previously under-represented in senior
decision-making councils. This was addressed in the Goldwater-
Nichols Act and only time will tell if the reform will be
successful. Goldwater-Nichols, however, does not provide a
formal input from all NATO commanders who would command and
control U.S. Armed Forces in the event of a war in Europe or the
North Atlantic.
23
5. Imbalance Between Service and DoD/Joint Interests
Under previous arrangements, the Military Departments and
Services exercised power and influence which were out of
proportion to their statutory roles. The predominance of Service
perspectives in DoD decision-making was understandable since DoD
is (still) not organized to effectively integrate Service
capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill major
missions, and since the old JCS system was dominated by the
Services which retained effective veto power over JCS actions,
and because the Unified commands were also dominated by strong
and independent Service component commanders. Generally, undue
Service influence arose principally from the weaknesses of
organizations that are responsible for military operations,
planning, and execution of plans.
This overwhelming influence of the Military Departments and
Services worked and still works at cross-purposes to efforts to
integrate the U.S. military establishment along mission lines
focused on outputs rather than inputs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act
was a major step taken by the Congress to legislate this problem
away. Although many of these realignments were critically needed
and were addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, they will not,
by themselves, be sufficient to correct the imbalance between
Service and joint interests.
The concept of unified command, as originally formulated in
the immediate postwar period has not been implemented. The
authority of the unified commanders remains limited although
enhanced by Goldwater-Nichols. The CinCs have somewhat more
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authority and a greater influence (in theory) over resource
allocation decisions. It remains to be seen whether as a result
of Goldwater-Nichols, the Unified commands will remain loose
confederations of single-Service forces which are unable to
provide effective combined arms actions across the spectrum of
military missions.
It has been claimed by defense critics that the operational
deficiencies evident during the Vietnam War, the seizure of the
Pueblo, and the Iranian hostage rescue mission were the result of
the failure to adequately implement the concept of unified
command
.
The basic attitudes and orientations of the professional
officer corps are a part of the problem. As long as the vast
majority of military officers gives their highest priority to the
interest of their Service or branch while losing sight of broader
and more important national or cross-Service needs -- and
believes that this behavior is correct because it is rewarded--
the problem of Service influence will remain. Powerful
resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the
basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the
culture of their Services until there are changes in the system
of Service promotions, military education, training, and
assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and
greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements and a genuine
combined arms perspective.
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The old JCS system was often criticized for being incapable
of providing useful and timely collective military advice. The
views of the JCS took entirely too long to prepare; and, most
importantly, often did not offer recommendations on issues
affecting more that one Service that were more than a compromise
that would achieve the four Service's unanimous agreement.
Inadequate "joint" advice was found in DoD activities,
including long-range strategic planning, programming planning,
deliberate and time sensitive operational planning, force
employment, discussion over roles and missions, organization of
the Unified commands, and development of doctrine. The role of
the CinCs, the CJCS, the collective JCS, each individual Service
Chief and Secretary, and the SECDEF, to provide military advise
on a substantial range of important strategy, resource,
operational, and organizational issues was not entirely clear.
An excellent example of this was the role played by Secretary of
the Navy John Lehman in The Maritime Strategy; perceived by many
to be a war-fighting strategy although the Secretary of the Navy
has no statutorily assigned role in developing war plans or in
carrying them out. Shortcomings in the ability of the military
to meaningfully address combined arms operational and planning
issues have had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare
for actual military operations.
By failing to provide sound military advise that crosses
Service boundaries, the SECDEF has often resorted to using
civilians, whether they are qualified or not, for advice on
issues for which military recommendations would have been
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preferred. The military was quick to criticize the direction of
the Vietnam War from OSD but proved incapable of reorganizing in
a manner that they could provide the SECDEF and the President
with the type of policy recommendations and politically astute
leadership that is required at the Washington headquarters level.
When politico-military leadership was provided, it often came
from the ranks of individuals who did not have educational
backgrounds or experience in national security affairs. The bias
is that any good staff officer should be able to fill such
strategy positions, even if his Washington headquarters
experience was in programming (or lacking altogether). The
selection of Admiral William J. Crowe as CJCS was a clear
exception but one man alone cannot make up for institutional
deficiencies.
The dual responsibilities of the Chiefs of Staff of each of
the Services, often referred to as "dual-hatting," is an inherent
conflict of interest problem for the Service Chiefs. One job
requires that they be effective advocates for their own Service.
The other job expects them to subordinate years of experience and
loyalties to Service interests to broader considerations. This
is a demand that challenges the most enlightened Service Chief.
Naturally, they have often been unable to balance these two
conflicting demands.
"Dual-hatting" also overburdens the Service Chiefs of Staff
by requiring them to shoulder more responsibilities than one
person should normally handle. Performing all the duties
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entailed in leading a military Service and assisting a Service
Secretary is more than enough to fully consume the time and
energy of a single individual.
The rational division of work among subordinate
organizations is one of the basic mechanisms for enhancing
organizational efficiency. Within DoD, this is often not done or
the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Excessive
Congressional oversight micro-management of defense-wide programs
and OSD micro-management of individual Service programs are key
examples of this problem. The DoD has been generally unable to
provide a more rational division of work among the operational
commanders, the Services, and OSD.
There is also a lack of clarity on the division of work
between civilian and military officials and organizations; yet
civilian control of the military remains a major national goal.
The NSC Staff, the State Department, and OSD contain many serving
military officers; not that such officers should not be providing
advise to civilian officials, but as it is well known, military
officers have been placed into positions that would normally be
considered political appointments.
In doing strategic planning, there is no standardization
over who should be doing the planning. On the one hand, some
organizations prefer to do all planning with in-house assets. On
the other hand, some organizations prefer to contract out
planning or rely upon the talents found in the private sector.
Government, in addition, tends to think that technological
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solutions will be provided by industry to all problems while
industry tends to overestimate the ability of government
personnel to compensate for poor performance by innovative
operations.
On the international level, there has been some division of
labor. Unfortunately, the result of these efforts have left the
United States in an embarrassing position with regard to
preparedness for national contingencies that have no role within
NATO, e.g. mine warfare capabilities in the Persian Gulf.
Clearly there is a need for national specialization, but we must
recognize that a result of such cost-saving measures may mean an
inability to perform tasks that are required in purely national
contingencies
.
6. Excessive Spans of Control and Insufficient Power
At most senior levels of the DoD, key leaders have an
excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. As was
mentioned earlier, twelve major defense agencies, eight major
DoD field activities, the CJCS, ten Unified and Specified combat
commands, three military departments, and thirty-three major
officials within OSD report to the SECDEF. Likewise, the Service
Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff have unwieldy spans of control.
Effective supervision and coordination of excessive numbers of
officials are not possible and as a result, organizational
inefficiency is substantial.
The SECDEF may not be able to effectively manage so complex
an organization as the DoD. The formal statutory authority of
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the Secretary provides him a full measure of power; the problem
emanates from a complex organization and powerful organizational
forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas can block
change from above. The Secretary probably lacks the tools,
levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively
manage the vast defense bureaucracy. The SECDEF is confronted by
powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and
can prevent him from carrying out his vast responsibilities.
Strengthening the power and influence of the SECDEF does
not automatically mean increased centralization. When
bureaucratic constraints and obstacles that diffuse the
Secretary's power are removed, he will be able to decentralize
management authority without losing control. Many
recommendations for defense reform offer the potential for the
SECDEF to realize the advantages of decentralized management
without loss of control.
7. Inadequate Quality of Strategic Planners
Problems with the quality of DoD strategic planning or
politico-military personnel have been mentioned previously. This
problem occurs in political appointee positions, the Service
Secretariats, in joint duty military positions, and especially in
duty assignments with Allied military organizations. Political
appointees are a problem because of their relative inexperience
(in some cases), high turnover rates, as well as lengthy
vacancies. For example, the position of Under Secretary of
Defense (Policy) remained unfilled for an extended period
following the resignation of Dr. Fred Ikle.
30
Extended periods of on-the-job training substitute for
education and previous experience. DoD has given insufficient
attention to the development of military officers capable of
effectively performing politico-military and strategic planning
duty assignments. Substantial disincentives to making such duty a
career path continue to persist. Goldwater-Nichols has certainly
forced the Services to change their assignment patterns with
regard to joint duty, but the question remains if the Services
have internalized such change mandated from outside or whether
they will revert to previous methods once key Congressional
leadership changes.
Even within Service staffs, strategic planning billets are
often filled by individuals who lack the requisite education and
designation as a strategic planner. Top performing officers
often see it to their best interests to come to Washington for a
tour in procurement rather than in policy planning. Top
performing officers, when assigned to policy planning staffs, are
often shuttled into key offices where they serve a brief first
experience generating tour prior to returning to operational
commands
.
Strategic planning education and training have been
addressed by the Congress as well as the DoD since the passage of
the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The recent emphasis on "joint"
education misses the mark since it only addresses part of the
problem. Furthermore, the attempt to upgrade education and
training has now become a basic power struggle between the DoD
and the Congress on who should control officer's careers.
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Although efforts to improve "joint" education and training
are movements in the right direction, they do not address the
concepts of strategic planning and strategic management that are
central to this research project. Moreover, many of the
"strategy" courses taught by the DoD focus on historical case
studies and are taught by historians rather than social and
political scientists that are oriented toward alternative futures
and the need to deal with uncertainty.
Some critics argue that the overriding solution to DoD
organizational problems is to improve the caliber of strategic
planners through education. While improving the quality of DoD's
planners is an important initiative, it should not, however, be
seen as a total substitute for organizational reform. Good people
can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational
structure. A well-designed structure, however, will support a
higher level of sustained effectiveness and obviate making
choices between good people and sound structure. Efforts to
improve DoD's strategic planning performance should emphasize
both structural change and enhancement of the skills of strategic
planners.
8. Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional
Oversight
Because the Congress has a central role in the overall
planning and management of the Nation's security, it must share
responsibility for any fundamental problems. The structure of the
Congress and its procedures for review produce inconsistent and
sometimes contradictory patterns of oversight, guidance, and
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micro-management. The existing pattern of oversight and shared
responsibility reinforces functional and other divisions within
DoD, inhibiting the development of a coherent and integrated
defense program. The Congress has been a major contributor to
the lack of mission integration and focus on outputs by the DoD.
There are a number of aspects to the Congressional problem.
First, multiple committees have cognizance over substantive and
fiscal issues; all issuing different instructions and providing
oversight with different structures, styles, and traditions.
These differences foster genuine confusion and successfully tempt
factions within DoD to export conflicts to the Congress.
Congressional interest on policy and program conflicts and
tensions within DoD, reinforces those conflicts. This problem,
however, is not limited to the Defense Department. One might
argue that the Congress has favored independent subordinate
military offices as opposed to centralized control in DoD, in
order to maximize their leverage in directing the allocation of
resources of determining the outcome of policy disputes.
Second, the Congress tends to review the defense program in
terms of individual Service programming inputs rather than in
terms of mission outputs. Trade-offs between Service
capabilities are made as often as they are in DoD itself.
Adjustments to the budget are often made for financial reasons
rather than for substantive reasons of priorities among missions.
Again, this problem is hardly limited to defense.
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Current congressional oversight and review practices have
resulted in substantial instability in defense policies and
programs. In part, this is the result of overemphasis of the
congressional budget process which has overwhelmed the remainder
of the legislative agenda. Increasingly, the Congress is
becoming involved in the details of the defense budget, not just
the broad policies and directions that guide it. Instability in
defense policies and programs has been further heightened by the
tendency of the Congress to look at military activities in only
fixed yearly increments with predictable short-sighted results.
Despite these problems, there is no move afoot to increase
the efficiency of the overall governmental planning, programming,
and budgeting process. This is understandable given our
Constitution, general distrust of government by the electorate,
and desire to maintain a separation of powers. Rather than focus
on how the planning process could be improved vis-a-vis Congress,
it is more appropriate to document the institutional realities
and search for means to cope.
9. Insufficient Mechanisms for Change
All military organizations throughout history, like all
large organizations, have been noted for their resistance to
change. The U.S. military establishment is no different in
resistance to change. However, in DoD, this tendency is magnified
by certain systemic problems that have been discussed previously.
Key among these problems is the inability to avoid roles and
missions disputes despite bureaucratic agreements among the
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Services which should have solved them; the Key West Agreement,
the Unified Command Plan, and other JCS Publications and
agreements being key examples; the predominant influence of the
Services; and Service control over promotions and assignments of
all military officers, including those in joint duty billets and
at Allied military organizations.
The result of these systemic problems is that DoD does not
have effective mechanisms for change; it lacks the ability to
correct certain deficiencies on its own. Despite often
substantial evidence of poor performance, DoD, like any
organization, expends much of its energies on defending the
status quo. The absence of an effective process of internal
self-correction and self -modification has resulted in an
undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures and
further Congressional interference.
10. Inadequate Feedback
Related to insufficient mechanisms for internally generated
change is the absence of useful feedback in many activities in
DoD. This particular criticism seems astounding to the average
line officer since so much of his time is consumed with the
compilation and reporting of facts to seniors in the chain of
command. Effective management control is not possible without
useful and timely feedback on actual operations and
implementation of plans. There is a strong need to simplify the
gathering of data and to find some mechanism to simplify it's
presentation to key decision-makers.
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Despite the fact that we will fight any future war in Europe
under the command of long-established allied military
organizations and in conjunction with Allies, not all the Allies
have been willing to share information with each other in
peacetime. France, for example, maintains a war-ready stockpile
of materials and supplies but the United States has been unable
to obtain the contents of those reserves and therefore conduct
adequate pre-war planning for mobilization needs. Numerous
Allies have asked over the years whether or not forces normally
assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command would "swing" to Europe in
the event of a war; only to receive conflicting responses.
The absence of useful feedback reduces management control of
the planning and the resource allocation process It also
precludes learning important lessons from poor staff preparation
and inadequate organizational performance. Past mistakes do not
receive the critical analysis and review that would hopefully
prevent them from recurring. DoD has not established a tradition
of comprehensive, critical, and internal evaluation of its own
performance in many areas of politico-military affairs. Rather
than concentrate on the outcome of crises that made use of
military forces, most flag and general officers prefer to discuss
the number of times a particular force was used. The proper
measure of effectiveness would be if the use of force, or that




We have seen in the previous sections that many of the
necessary conditions to strategically managing DoD and its
multiple organizational units currently do not exist. In fact,
the present system has built in impediments to the effective
exercise of strategic management. We are thus confronted with a
dilemma. To what extent is the goal of introducing strategic
management in DoD too ambitious for the organization's present
capacity to respond and adapt? How realistic is it to pursue
this goal given the organizational and interorganizational
realities?
Our position on this issue is as follows. While the full
application of strategic management to DoD and DoD organizations
may not be possible at the present time, the immediate goal of
laying the groundwork to make strategic management an eventuality
in the future is realistic. If some of the barriers to
strategic management can be eliminated, if some support for the
principles of strategic management can be built among military
personnel, if some of the tools and techniques of strategic
management can be introduced and used in our organizations to
help DoD adapt and change, then we will be well on the road to
the full-scale introduction of strategic management to DoD.
We recognize that this interim process will not be easy and
that it must be approached from many different levels. Congress
has taken an important step with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986. Changes in DoD structure, processes and systems and in the
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areas of military strategy, procurement, officer education, and
promotions are important beginnings
:
- enhanced power of the CJCS to make recommendations of his
own as well as to represent the views of the collected JCS. The
Chairman is assisted by a new four-star Deputy.
- the views of the war-fighting CinCs are to be sought more
often in the programming and budgeting process.
- joint duty is now reguired for promotion to flag/general
officer. Joint duty cannot be performed until the officer is a
graduate of a joint professional military education course.
- the Service Secretary and military staffs have been
consolidated to some degree.
However, these efforts are only a beginning. More needs to
be done, especially at the individual level of analysis -- in the
education and training of our officers. We need to instill in
them an appreciation and working knowledge of strategic
management tools, strategies and principles. This is how we see
our role in the change process at NPS. While corrections in DoD
structure and process may be beyond our purview, part of our
charter is the education and development of officers in DoD
strategic management.
In this section, we will outline the current educational
reform efforts underway in both the National Security Affairs
(NSA) Department and the Department of Administrative Sciences at
NPS.
Background .
The NPS has the charter for education of naval officers in
the strategic planning subspecialty. Such education is not
provided during the officer recruitment process nor is the
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strategic planning subspecialty code awarded following attendance
at one of the Service Command and Staff or War Colleges.
In order to be designed a strategic planner, the Navy has
provided NPS with criteria which must be satisfied. These
criteria, known as educational skill requirements, are as
follows:
"Graduates of this program will possess a firm
understanding of the broad range of considerations
involved in the formulation of U.S. national policy and
military strategy. This will include an appreciation
of the threats to the United States and its allies, the
mechanics of U.S. policy formulation, the development
and execution of military strategy, the components of
that strategy, and the assets available to meet
national strategic objectives. The following specific
requirements will be addressed:
Threats
The Soviet Union - A thorough understanding of the
Soviet Union to include the historical development of
the Soviet State and the Warsaw Pact; the relationship
of Soviet political, economic and military doctrine;
Soviet political and military involvement in third
world insurgency; nuclear and conventional military
doctrine and strategy; Soviet role in nuclear
proliferation; Soviet resources and mobilization
potential; and a net assessment of U.S. /USSR economic
and military strength.
Other threats - An appreciation for other threats to
U.S. interests and those of its allies, which should
include such issues as the Middle East confrontations
including Muslim fundamentalism, the Arab/Israeli
conflict, and the Persian Gulf War; the growth of
international terrorism; threats to the Pacific Rim
including Philippine insurgency, North Korea, and
Vietnam; instability in Central and South America and
Africa; and other issues of contemporary concern.
Formulation of U.S. Policy
The formulation of U.S. National Security Policy and
Foreign Policy. This should address the role of the
President, NSC, intelligence organizations, Congress,
State Department, DoD, JCS and interagency groups in
policy formulation, and the range of measures available
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to the U.S. to meet its policy objectives such as arms
control agreements, security assistance, membership in
international organizations, bilateral diplomacy and
application of military power.
Development and Execution of Military Strategy
American military history including the origins and
evolution of national strategy; current American and
allied military strategies which addresses the entire
spectrum of conflict; the U.S. Maritime Strategy; the
organizational structure of the U.S. defense
establishment; the role of the CinCs in strategic
planning; the process of strategic planning; joint and
Service doctrine, and the roles and missions of each
meeting national strategy.
Assets Available to Meet National Objectives
Nuclear deterrence - U.S. nuclear capabilities and
doctrine including capabilities of each Service;
current and projected Soviet nuclear capabilities and
doctrine; current and projected capabilities of China,
France, the United Kingdom and other potential nuclear
powers; Nuclear command, control, and communications
including U.S. /NATO organization for nuclear war; basic
nuclear weapon allocation and application theory
including impact of footprinting weapons, nuclear
planning factors, and the targeting process (Single
Integrated Operational Plan and Theater Nuclear Forces)
at the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff,
Dahlgren, etc.
Space - Development of the Strategic Defense Initiative
including doctrine for use, potential capabilities, and
economic, political and technological restraints;
antisatillite and other military applications of space;
launch capabilities and supportability issues of the
U.S. space program.
Technology - The role of U.S. technological superiority
in the development of defense strategy and the
implication of technology transfer on national security.
Chemical and Biological Warfare - Doctrine regarding
the use of chemical and biological weapons, global
balance of these weapons, treaties regarding their
employment, and history of their use.
Logistics - Mobilization capability of the U.S. and its
allies including the adeguacy of their industrial base,
natural resource supplies, reserve forces, etc. to meet
strategic planning objectives; the role of mobilization
in deterrence, the importance of logistics throughout
the planning process.
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Economics - Implications of U.S. defense budgets on the
American economy, political factors involved in the
formulation of the defense budget, and the mechanics of
the defense budgeting process; the PPBS.
Alliances U.S. involvement in alliance relationships
including a thorough understanding of the history and
substance of NATO, and an appreciation for other
alliances such as the Organization of American States,
the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Treaty and arrangements
with Japan, the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, etc.
Intelligence - U.S. intelligence resources,
methodologies and reliability.
Naval Warfare - Recent developments in naval warfare
and their contributions to meeting National and
Maritime Strategies.
Diplomacy - Use of negotiations, trade agreements, and
other diplomatic measures to achieve national
objectives.
International Law - Rudiments of international law
including law of the sea and the laws of war."
Curriculum Goals
The focus of NPS educational efforts in strategic planning
is to develop the student's craftsmanship in the art and the
understanding of the strategic planning and strategic management
process, not to give the student training on the current answers
or strategies of fashion. The faculty is encouraged to have the
student master principles of planning and management that they
can later employ to help top leadership of the DoD manage change.
Having the students recognize that national defense is
achieved with more than the resources available to the DoD will
be a major goal and logical result of our efforts. Strategic
planning simply must be more than a discussion of the share of
the budget available to DoD or any one Service and include an
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examination of peacetime (and wartime) national goals and
objectives, including an analysis of the vast governmental and
private tools which can be mobilized to achieve those goals.
Similarly, the students are taught that there are many more
resources to draw upon than the traditional ones taught in
political science departments at civilian graduate schools.
One of the immediate objectives of our sponsored project is
to revisit the above listed educational skill requirements in
conjunction with a regularly scheduled curricular review of the
NSA Programs in the Spring of 1989. This review will have the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations - Plans, Policy, and Operations
(OP-06), or his designated representative, review the current
requirements and make revisions as necessary.
It is the investigators' contention, and apparently those of
the sponsors of this project, that the educational skill
requirements for politico-military strategic planners are
basically sound but that they could benefit from some marginal
improvements along the lines of the concepts outlined in this
report. Associate Professor Tritten will take the lead role in
explaining these concepts to the Navy staff personnel assigned to
the curricular review in order to secure the desired changes.
Figure 3 is a listing of the current matrix outlining the
courses that NPS offers to strategic planning students to meet
the requirements for designation as a strategic planner and earn
the Master of Arts degree. For those readers interested in a
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brief catalog description of each of the courses, we have
attached them as Appendix A.
The current matrix does not show the new Administrative
Sciences Department capstone strategic management course, MN
4105, being required for strategic planners. That course will be
phased into the curriculum during the Spring Quarter of academic
year 1989. The course that it will replace has not been
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Research Output
The principle output from the research will be an NPS
technical report which will used as a textbook. It is anticipated
that the textbook will be used at NPS in two different academic
departments and at the Defense Resources Management Education
Center (DRMEC). We naturally hope that the text will find use at
the National Defense University, Service Command and Staff and
War Colleges, and at Service academies.
A significant by-product of the textbook creation will be
the teaching of strategic management and strategic planning
courses and classes. As a result of the teaching effort, NPS
hopes to build a cadre of people who understand the long-term
competitive international political-military environment and the
need to manage institutions over time. Our efforts are intended
to create a consciousness and a language of strategic management
within the DoD. We are therefore consciously attempting to
change the corporate culture of DoD.
Research Team
Approaching change at this level is difficult, but we
recognize that it is only the beginning of an effort that will
require the collective energy of many different people and
organizations. At present, we have involved personnel from each
of the four sponsoring organizations, NPS faculty and students
from the NSA Department, the Administrative Sciences Department,
DRMEC, as well as the 1988-89 Navy Federal Executive Fellow at
the Brookings Institution, and individuals employed at the
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Analysis Center of the Northrop Corporation. There are
additional individuals who may join the research team as they are
exposed to our project plans.
Associate Professor James Tritten is a Navy Commander who is
currently serving as the Chairman of the NSA Department. In
previous tours of duty, he has been the Assistant Director, Net
Assessment, in OSD, and the Joint Strategic Plans Officer on the
Navy Staff. Professor Tritten is a proven Navy subspecialist in
both general and nuclear strategic planning. He has a Ph.D. and
M.A. in international relations from the University of Southern
California.
Associate Professor Nancy Roberts is a member of the
Administrative Sciences Department where she specializes in
teaching strategic management. She has served as the principal
investigator on a number of related research projects and been a
professional management consultant for a number of major firms
for over ten years. She has a Ph.D. from Stanford University in
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Education specializing in organizational change and development
and an M.A. in history from the University of Illinois.
One associate investigator, a faculty member at DRMEC, Dr.
Darnell Whitt, will join the research effort when he reports for
duty as an Associate Professor in November 1988. Dr. Whitt will
be leaving his present position as the Intelligence Advisor to
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy It is anticipated that
he will concentrate on the intelligence aspects of strategic
planning.
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The final associate member of the research team is CDR John
Kenney, USN, this year's Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the
Brookings Institution. CDR Kenney desired to spend a portion of
his fellowship year working on a strategic planning project.
John intends to fully investigate the recent strategic planning
effort conducted by Australia and to analyze the success of both
the planning effort and the execution of those plans. CDR Kenney
will prepare a full case study which will be published by NPS as
a technical report and be made available to students taking our
related courses as well as those in the Far East area studies
program.
Efforts During Fiscal Year 1988
Work commenced on the project in January 1988 with a
research trip by Associate Professor Roberts to the Washington,
D.C. area and interviews with a number of key individuals in the
field of DoD strategic planning. The major effort was to
acguaint Professor Roberts with the DoD and the magnitude of the
problem. At the same time, Associate Professor Tritten was
gathering resources in Monterey and preparing the course outline
for the first revised NSA Department Seminar in Strategic
Planning, NS 4230. This course is the capstone for strategic
planning students and is only taught once a year. The course
outline is attached as Appendix B.
NS 4230 was first taught in a major revised fashion during
the Spring Quarter of Academic Year 1988. Students who took this
course were assigned case studies that had been suggested by the
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sponsor. Sixteen case studies were developed and have been typed
into a project report and distributed to the sponsors and other
interested parties: "Student Reports in Strategic Planning," NPS-
56-88-031PR, September 1988, 301 pp.
The cases developed by the students in NS 4230 and printed
in that project report are contained in Figure 4:
Figure 4
STUDENT REPORTS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
NPS-56-88-031PR
Part I_: National Headquarters Level Strategic Planning/Management
- The 1987 and 1988 Reports on the National Security Strategy
- A Planning System Case Study Analysis of Discriminate Deterrence
- Competitive Strategies
- The Marshall Plan: A Case Study in Strategic Planning
- McNamara and Program Budgeting: Is the First "P" in "PPBS" Silent
Part II : Navy Strategic Planning
- The Navy's General Board
- United States Inter-War Planning—From Orange to Rainbow
- The B-36/USS United States Controversy
- Navy Long-Range Planning: The Extended and Strategic View
- Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study
- The Maritime Strategy: A Case Study in Strategic Planning
Part III Other Cases of Strategic Planning/Management
- Air Force Long Range Planning
- The National Defense Stockpile: Planning for Mobilization or
Politics?
- The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Planning for Petroleum Security
- NASA in the 1960s: Management Success, Planning Failure
- The Supersonic Transport
Part I of the student reports contains examples of strategic
planning and management done at the Washington headquarters
level. The first of these is an example of strategic planning
which results from a Congressional mandate, and performed by line
organizations within the executive branch of government. The two
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White House reports, National Security Strategy of the United
States , represent planning in the abstract - a plan not tied at
all to any execution effort.
The second report is an example of a Blue-Ribbon panel
commissioned jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the
previously mentioned White House reports, Discriminate Deterrence
is the result of planning done without regard to execution of
that plan under a strategic management scheme. The third report
is the result of original research done by a student on the
introduction of competitive strategies (a business concept) into
the Defense Department. Since this is an on-going effort,
complete findings are premature.
The final two cases presented in Part I are examples of
strategic management at the national level. In the case of the
Marshall Plan, multiple agencies in Washington were able to agree
on an international plan of action and successfully execute that
plan. In the case of PPBS, introduced into the DoD during the
tenure of Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the plan for PPBS was
developed and executed, with mixed results. Like many reform
efforts, PPBS was an attempt to introduce rationality into what
is an otherwise political decision-making process.
Part II contains individual reports that are examples of
Navy strategic planning and one case of joint service planning
with emphasis on the Navy and a maritime theater of military
operations. The focus on the Navy, despite the lack of official
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sponsorship of this project by the Navy, is logical since the
student body of the NSA classes is entirely made up of active
duty naval officers who are enrolled in the strategic planning
curricula.
The first case in Part II involves a historical example of
strategic planning done by the Navy prior to World War I. Inter-
War strategic planning and in particular, war planning, is
examined in the second case study. In both cases, the
relationship of pre-war planning to execution of plans during a
war is of interest to the reader.
The third report in Part II deals with attempts to implement
strategic plans by two services that were in disagreement over
basic roles and missions. The post-War B-36/USS United States
controversy is well known within the defense community as an
example of interservice rivalry at its most damaging.
The final three reports in Part II deal with more recent
attempts at long-range strategic planning within the Navy. The
first is an overview of general efforts within the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. The second is a examination of a
special ad hoc planning effort conducted by the Navy that made
use of the expertise at the Naval War College.
The final report in Part II is a look at the creation of The
Maritime Strategy under the Reagan administration. The Maritime
Strategy is an example of strategic planning and strategic
management conducted by a staff organization itself. The results
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of this section are, in part, a result of participation by-
faculty and students in the "Maritime Strategy in the Pacific
Conference" held at the NPS during August 1987. At that
conference were many of the individuals who were responsible for
the writing of The Maritime Strategy and others who worked on
earlier and similar concepts of operations. The conference was
sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy).
Part III contains additional strategic planning cases that
Navy strategic planning students would have not normally been
exposed to prior to this research project. The first of these
involves Air Force efforts in long range planning. The Air Force
method of planning is in sharp contrast to that of the Navy. The
final NS 4230 seminar session included a retired Army general
officer whose focus was on the differences in substance and style
in service strategic planning efforts. The final session also
addressed the question "should naval officers be strategists?"
The next two reports concern multi-agency efforts to manage
the national defense stockpile and strategic petroleum reserve.
Both endeavors involve strategic analysis, planning, and actual
execution of plans. These two plans involve international
economic and politico-military affairs and both thoroughly
involve the legislative and executive branches of the government.
The final two student reports involve strategic planning by
non-defense organizations. The report on the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) finds that good
management can overcome poor planning. The second, the
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Supersonic Transport, involves reasonably good planning but a
failure to successfully execute the plan.
Each of the student papers is supposed to have a background
of the international or national context at the time, a brief
description of the strategic planning/management system itself,
key assumptions made by personnel involved in the process, and an
analysis of the key elements that resulted in success or failure
of the plan or the execution of that plan. Some of these student
reports will eventually be developed into formal case studies and
included in our final technical report at the end of the three
years research effort.
One of the questions that we have had to ask ourselves is
whether significant politico-military case studies only can be
researched and taught at the classified level? If this proves to
be the case, we will have to deal with these cases in a
classified teaching environment and issue a classified appendix
to planned government technical reports, omitting those cases
from any commercial books that subsequently follow.
One of the benefits of teaching this capstone course at a
military school was that the instructor and students were able to
refer to classified documents when it came time to discuss actual
war planning as a strategic planning case study. The major
differences between doing planning for near-term conflict, based
on forces actually on hand, and planning for programming, based
on goals and the ability to build new forces, is rarely
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appreciated at any civilian school and often not within the DoD
itself.
Professor Roberts audited NS 4230 to get a better idea of
the perspective of politico-military students rather than those
with a business outlook. She presented a series of guest
seminars to introduce the concept of strategic management. At
the same time, Professor Roberts prepared a course outline for a
Strategic Management: Public and Private seminar for the
Administrative Sciences Department. This course, MN 4105, also
is a capstone course for students enrolled in varying
administrative sciences curricula.
In MN 4105, students were previously oriented toward
business methods and examples. Professor Roberts increased the
emphasis of strategic management in the public sector and used
some of the reports prepared by the NSA students. The two
departments will attempt to improve their ability to cross-
fertilize their curricula by sharing faculty. In academic year
1989, one NSA faculty member will teach a basic organizational
theory course to administrative sciences students, introducing
them to more DoD issues and case studies. NSA strategic planning
students will have their education matrix changed to be enrolled
in MN 4105 prior to taking NS 4230 during their last quarter.
The course outline for MN 4105 is attached as Appendix C.
During the Summer Quarter of Academic Year 1988, the
investigators met with all the sponsors and selected additional
interested parties from Northrop Corporation. They reported on
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the progress to date and distributed advance copies of the case
studies developed by the students. The two-day meeting generated
a significant amount of discussion and suggestions were made by
the participants as to the composition of the NSA curricula in
strategic planning. Revised matrices were offered as well as
outlines for some additional recommended courses. Some of the
changes that will be made to the strategic planning curriculum
will be done locally. Some will be discussed with the Navy
sponsor for these programs during a scheduled curriculum review
in the Spring of 1989. The Superintendent of the NPS attended a
final wrap-up session with the sponsors and the investigators.
The investigators also met with a number of government
agencies and private firms during the Spring and Summer Quarters
in order to evaluate their efforts in doing long-range strategic
planning and strategic management. Initial interviews were held
with the Navy Civil Engineering Laboratory, the Rockwell
Corporation, and Boeing Aerospace.
The investigators had previously met with representatives of
the U.S. Department of Commerce staff concerning this project.
One of the areas that we learned about was the existence of the
National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) . Membership of the
NDER includes many current and retired chief executive officers
and corporate strategic planners. All are concerned with the
lack of industrial mobilization planning within the U.S.
In September 1988, the investigators met with NDER staff and
members in Atlanta, Chicago, Monterey, and Washington, D.C.
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Presentations on the project were made to members and staff
assembled for their annual training sessions. A number of NDER
members contacted the investigators and offered to share insights
and experiences that may prove to be useful to the project.
Additionally, two students were supervised by the
investigators in their own thesis research. The first of these
was "A Theory of Naval Strategic Planning" by Lieutenant John R.
Hafey. LT Hafey's thesis, completed in June 1988, proposed a
theory for naval strategic planning that would be useful for
programming. It identifies and describes those factors which
should have an influence on how the Navy determines future force
requirements and eventual capabilities.
LT Hafey's work was based upon the rational actor model
where naval long-range planning would be derived from national
military strategy, the role of sea power in the context of
national requirements, nationally derived missions, and future
trends in technology and warfare. LT Hafey attempted to
reconcile the need for planning with the inability of social
scientists to predict the future.
Sponsors were provided copies of this thesis during their
meeting in Monterey. An additional seventy-five copies were sent
to military planning staff offices, libraries, and selected
defense contractors. Other interested parties may obtain a copy
of this thesis from the Defense Technical Information Center.
Associate Professor Tritten was the advisor for this thesis.
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The second of these student theses is "The Rand Strategy-
Assessment System: A New Perspective on Decision Support
Systems," by Lieutenant Commander Philip K. Siddons. LCDR
Siddons looked into modern on-line strategic analysis and
wargaming systems as a potential decision support system. He
analyzed the use of such systems and one in particular, to be
used by key decision-makers in group decisions and crisis
decision management. LCDR Siddons concluded that such systems
should be used for staff analytic support but not by key decision
makers or even in the command centers where real-world decisions
are being made. Associate Professor Tritten was the advisor for
this thesis and Associate Professor Roberts was second reader.
Distribution of this thesis will be made shortly.
A third thesis is currently being prepared. This thesis
will deal with an examination of the process of net assessments
and how they fit into the overall strategic planning process.
This thesis will be written by LT Anthony Konecny and is expected
to be completed by December 1988. Associate Professor Tritten is
the advisor for this thesis and Associate Professor Whitt will be
the second reader. It is anticipated that the thesis will be
used as a text for the American National Security Objectives and
Net Assessment seminar, NS 4251, to be taught by Associate




(1) Education at Military or Civilian Schools?
One of the first questions that is raised about educating
officers in such a manner is whether or not strategic planning or
strategic management education should take place at a civilian or
military school. A continual topic for discussion with the Navy
is whether NPS should even be in the business of political-
military education or whether officers requiring such education
can receive a better education at a civilian school. Obviously
intelligence programs must be taught at a government school since
most of the course materials are classified. At the other end of
the spectrum, the area studies and international organizations
and negotiations programs are found at numerous excellent
civilian schools.
Until last year, the strategic planning curriculum was
identical to that found in better civilian schools. Due to
recent changes, however, NPS arguably has the most innovative
and dynamic strategic planning program in the United States.
Although many aspects of nuclear strategic planning can be found
to some degree at civilian universities, the depth of the nuclear
side of this curriculum and the bulk of the general strategic
planning program is not, and cannot, be duplicated at a civilian
school.
For example, civilian schools do not have faculty that have
experience in general strategic planning aspects that the Navy
desires cultivated in our students; e.g. war planning. NPS
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offers faculty that have had unique in-government strategic
planning experience that cannot be duplicated by those not in
uniform. Science, engineering, and business schools all suggest
that their faculty have experience tours so that they will have
an appreciation for the art of the possible as well as normative
desires. Due to the nature of classified military strategic
planning, civilians, even those in government service, simply do
not participate in some of the key aspects of joint planning - a
key to understanding the conduct of war.
Some of the other advantages which NPS offers over civilian
schools are: a faculty and student body that share the same
interest in Navy relevant education and concern for performance
after the degree; the ability to easily mix technical/engineering
courses with policy courses in our own department (this is
crucial in our intelligence program and cannot be duplicated at
the Defense Intelligence College); the ability to conduct
instruction and perform research at the classified level
(including Special Compartmented Information); attention to the
special needs of students en route to specific countries;
responsiveness to the detailing problem - i.e. we can take
students onboard four times a year (many schools only admit
students once a year); ability to guarantee that courses will be
taught (especially critical for the area studies programs);
ability to manipulate admissions standards by allowing students
to take prerequisites; and unique ability to tailor the courses
taught to be responsive to the needs of sponsors.
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A frequently overlooked advantage of military education for
military strategic planners is that when civilian schools
political science departments teach strategic planning, they tend
to focus on only international or national political or social
science aspects. The DoD has a need for planners that can
address planning at the regional or CinC level as well as the
functional level. For example, each CinC and each of the major
functional procurement offices at the Washington Headquarters
have planners. Finding a civilian school that would be capable
of addressing the politico-military planning needs of naval
aviation would be difficult.
One of the criticisms levied at NPS is that its conservative
student body and generally conservative faculty do not offer the
students an opportunity to view the broad cross-section of
political views in the nation. This problem can be overcome with
participation of outsiders at NPS. For example, during the past
Spring quarter, faculty from NPS were invited to the University
of California at Santa Cruz (UCSC) where they gave a variety of
guest lectures to political science classes. In turn, UCSC
faculty and students were invited to the capstone seminar in
strategic planning. The interaction was extremely beneficial to
all the participants, especially the naval officers who otherwise
may have not been exposed in the classroom to biases likely to be
found amongst the generally liberal faculty and student body of
UCSC. This exchange will be encouraged in the future.
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(2) Who is to do strategic management/planning?
The Navy is biased to having serious strategic planning done
by in-house personnel; preferably those in uniform. The Navy
does have outside "experts" which are brought into the system
from time to time but once those "experts" have left, complete
planning and execution is done by uniformed officers. Many flag
officers distrust civilian think tanks (even the Center for Naval
Analyses) and defense contractors.
On the other hand, OSD appears to be biased in the opposite
direction. OSD ad hoc, study groups, and Blue Ribbon panels
abound. Certainly final decisions are made by those in office
but participation by groups appears to be the norm to the point
that the active duty military officer's role in OSD may be
reduced to management of contracts rather than doing actual
strategic planning. This method is an acceptable one for doing
government business but affects the guality of the training or
education that DoD should then give to its strategic planners.
To best answer the guestion of who should do strategic
planning involves decisions on where that planning is to be done.
If war planning is done at the CinC staff level, it is probably
best done with military personnel in the lead. Some CinCs,
however, probably cannot do their planning in the absence of
participation of other non-military agencies, or Allied
governments, and the private sector. For example, serious
planning by Transportation Command must involve more than just
the military personnel involved. Even planning for execution by
the Strategic Air Command benefits from contract support.
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Can the government do serious strategic planning in the
absence of involvement with the private sector? If industry is
to be involved, how can this be done without conflict of
interest? There is a definite bias by some personnel in uniform
to keep strategic planning divorced from government contracting
types that are perceived as having only an interest in turning a
profit. Tough conflict of interest laws discourage a strong
interaction between contractors and government employees.
Some of the best strategic planning minds in the country are
outside of government. To think that strategic planning can be
done without the active participation of the private sector is to
deprive the government of a wealth of talent. Yet despite the
reality of an active cooperation between the private sector and
government at the highest levels of DoD, the services have taught
strategic planning from the perspective of the JSPS; it is all
done from the inside.
The myth is then perpetuated by case studies and textbooks
that ignore the contribution of the private sector. War college
curricula focus on "military" strategy and rarely address
concepts found in the Harvard Business Review .
There will always be a need for in-house planners due to the
use of certain types of sensitive classified material, and the
limitations on the release of war plans and actual war planning
concepts. Since it is the military that must execute war plans,
which are strategic plans, then in-house personnel must be able
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to bridge the gap between military capabilities and political
desires.
Is there a role for strategic planning/management any more
at the military service level or should all war planning be done
by allied organizations, the CINCs and JCS? This is a bit more
difficult. The services must train, educate, and designate
strategic planners that wear their uniforms but war planning is
done above the service level.
If we shift all programming planning to the CINCs, JCS, and
OSD, then do we have the same problem in programming? How do
diversified corporations handle similar problems? Our initial
efforts reveal that most major corporations cannot and do not do
corporate level strategic planning of the type that we are
talking about being required for DoD. They do, however, have
extremely good strategic planning cells at the company level.
(3) Should strategic planning done all the time or in
spurts?
If done all the time, where do you start? With the goals of
the organization, the threat, the resources available? Our
research to date reveals no real consensus on how to start the
planning effort. Obviously there are some logical starting
points for different types of organizations.
For war planners, the logical starting point is by assessing
available resources. For programming planners, the logical
starting point is desired goals but often, we have found, the
actual starting point will be current resources and some sense of
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the share of the whole. The threat as a starting point is often
the focus of corporate strategic planners or politico-military
planners that are fixated on the single threat of the Soviet
Union.
If strategic planning is done all the time, how can those
line organizations in the system take it seriously? One of the
failings of the JSPS is that it is so bureaucratic and
regularized that creative thinking is neither appreciated nor
desired. Some non-military organizations that we have seen have
similar formalized planning systems but both researchers wondered
if there was anyone in the operational side of the organization
that took the plans seriously.
If strategic planning is not regularized but instead is done
in spurts, what is the detection mechanism for the need for
change? Often a signal is a changing threat. In the political-
military world, changes in plans (and even the planning process)
are a logical outgrowth of changes in political leadership in the
country. Program planners change plans and the execution of
plans once the budget process has run its full course. War
planners change plans during the plan approval process and the
integration of a single CinC's plans with those of others.
Obviously war planners change the execution of plans during war.
Planning does not necessarily mean that plans (or even
operations) will be successfully completed. Poor planning can
hurt both the creation of a plan and execution. The inter-war
years provide excellent case studies of poor analysis (estimates
63
of strategic bombing damage following World War I) that were
perpetuated and resulted in faulty plans, poor recommendations
for programs, poor political decisions, and poor execution of
strategies.
Other British inter-war examples, however, demonstrate that
good planning can be done at the inter-agency level. Actions
taken by industry, the Royal Navy, and the Ministry of Defense
before the outbreak of hostilities indicate that pre-war
preparation can occur. In each case of a critical decision,
however, an external threat signal was sent and caused a revision
of planning estimates.
Forecasting the future is obviously difficult in the social
sciences. Our research indicates that the major agencies charged
with such tasks within the DoD, the intelligence services, are
too narrowly focused on military matters to provide adequate
advise to the Secretary. Emphasis appears to be needed in the
full range of methodologies available for exploration of
alternative futures. Corporate strategic planners seem to have a
much broader horizon for considering alternative futures. This
may be due to the economic incentives to do so. This leads us
back to the reality that if the private sector is doing the
serious work in futures, then government strategic planning must
involve these people. We intend to make intelligence and
forecasting a major chapter in the final technical report.
The gathering of data on one's own capabilities is another
issue that is related to strategic planning. The inability of
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DoD to have agreed upon data bases of its own forces is shocking.
Programmers desire capability assessments to reflect those called
for in systems specifications. War planners must have realistic
assessments of own force capabilities.
Each of the services is guilty in this area. Air Force
estimates for manned bomber penetration have always been
questioned by outsiders. The kill rates that each U.S. submarine
must attain against Soviet combined arms forces in "bastions" are
higher than most outside analysts are willing to concede. The
ability of ground forces to hold turf in Europe has been
politicized to the point that models exist to support anyone's
biases.
An asymmetry found in Soviet planning is that they take
military history quite seriously and use it as the object of
study for both strategies, operations, and tactics, but also to
validate pre-war estimates for force capabilities. It appears
that military history will never be supported in such a manner by
academic institutions within the U.S. and if such efforts are
desired by the government, they will likely have to be funded by
the public sector.
The researchers discovered that the inability to gather
information on one's own forces is shared by the private sector.
Long-range strategic planning by all firms that we have visited
tends to be limited to divisions and minimal at the corporate
level. It appears that just as the services are in competition
with each other, divisions vie for resources within corporations
making corporate level planning very difficult. The Commerce
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Department shares this frustration with their inability to gather
data on the capabilities of U.S. (and allied) firms that would
need to be mobilized during war. Some NDER members have suggested
that the government simply use Chamber of Commerce data.
Initial Observations
Our analysis thus far leads us to structure the concept of
strategic management in four main areas, each of which builds on
the other:
(1) Thinking: Much "thinking" passes as strategic planning
and management. The emphasis is on "thinking grand thoughts" or
conceptualizing in a broad macro sense. The basic techniques for
strategic thinking are expert opinion and the delphi technique.
Expert opinion is available to virtually everyone; i.e. books
such as former President Richard Nixon's new work 1999 or
Zbigniew Brzezinski's Game Plan . These are examples of experts
who have a clear vision of the future, the problem, and naturally
some recommended solution, and are willing to share it with the
public for the price of a book. Obviously there will always be a
place for this (authors, consultants, & politicians) but merely
thinking out a problem is not enough.
(2) Analysis: Again, much of what is called strategic
planning or management is really analysis. Strategic analysis
emphasizes alternatives and the consequences of alternative
courses of action. As we move from strategic thinking into
strategic analysis, we start to use modern analytic tools instead
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of only simple expert judgment to develop alternative futures,
alternative courses of action, and consequences. Cross-impact
matrices are created to look at the relationship of variables.
Simple trend extrapolation is used to predict short-term futures.
Scenario building can be used as a stand-alone methodology or be
used as an input for games and simulations which help analysts in
prediction and sensitivity and contingency analysis.
Some examples of strategic analysis are found in three of
the student reports: the B-36 vs USS United States, Discriminate
Deterrence , National Security Strategy of the U.S. , and Sea Plan
2000. The distinction between strategic analysis and strategic
planning is that in strategic analysis, there is a lack of a
specific plan for actual action by the parties concerned.
(3) Planning: Planning is an exercise in thinking and
analysis that leads to the actual creation of a plan of action.
This planning can be done on a number of different levels: short-
term planning, long-range planning and nuclear planning, all of
which are used in DoD; strategic planning or strategic
management which are used in business and industry. Much of what
passes for planning education in civilian political science
departments is actually military strategy or strategic nuclear.
There is a whole world of strategic planning, however, found in
business schools that is rarely addressed by political
scientists.
This is surprising since the Soviet Union is the ultimate
planning state. Some would argue that we in the United States
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would increase the efficiency of our military forces if we would
adopt the Soviet model for defense planning. How many of us,
however, would be willing to change our way of life, our free
enterprise system, or our government in order to accommodate the
changes necessary to increase efficiency in planning? Despite
all their accomplishments in the planning area, fortunately the
Soviets are terrible at execution.
With the passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act, recent attention
has been on "joint" military planning. Congress has lead the
military services into a call for improved planning but the focus
again remains on military issues and not on the creation of a
national plan in peacetime. Interestingly, emphasis for such
planning comes from experts, usually associated with political
causes. Our previously mentioned books 1999 and Game Plan
actually contain comprehensive plans of action for the management
of the competitive inter-state relationship.
There is a long history of attempts at or long-range
planning by the military. Between the wars, the services
cooperated and developed war plans that formed the basis for the
campaigns that were fought in the Pacific. With the creation of
the DoD, each of the services undertook a review of their roles
and missions and each set up some type of a planning group. Our
focus thus far has been on planning efforts by the JCS, the Navy
and Air Force, and the other two services will be looked at
during the coming years
.
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Also, much of what passes for planning in the military
actually concerns itself with programming and budgetary issues.
The services appear to be very comfortable with the fact that
their Washington headguarters staffs are devoted to a great deal
to support of the budget. Planning meetings generally never
mention the name of another nation on the face of the earth.
Strategic planning and management by private corporations,
on the other hand, is very focused upon the competition. The
military has used corporate methods, from time to time, but the
legacy of the McNamara experience has soured the services on
borrowing from industry. Recently the DoD has mandated another
attempt to borrow concepts from the private sector with the
attempted use of competitive strategies.
Military planning often takes place in an inter-agency
context, often with the DoD not necessarily taking the lead role.
Documentation on the inter-agency process is difficult to obtain
but it appears that we should be able to use the Graduated
Mobilization Response plan, and efforts to stockpile strategic
minerals and oil. These plans suits our study well since they
are tied to the ability to fight and sustain war and have a
distinct international context.
(4) Strategic Management: Strategic management as we have
defined in the introduction of this report is the management of
the total organization or system. While thinking, analysis, and
planning are important components, strategic management also
includes the execution phase where the plan is actually
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implemented and monitored. Interestingly, the existing JSPS is
an excellent case study of strategic management since all of the
elements are there. Unfortunately, many have argued that this
system produces plans that although they are often executed, are
not necessarily in the best interests of the U.S.
Military planners are not comfortable with the term
strategic management yet perform most of the elements required;
i.e. they think through the execution phase of the plan. Despite
this, strategic management has not been taught to strategic
planning students. The focus on strategic planning education
often includes the execution phase but often from a historical
perspective and not necessarily from that of the social
scientist.
There is a sub-set of the military planning community that
does not necessarily address successful execution of the plan.
This was a major criticism of the military under the Carter
Presidency; defense of the United States was viewed as being best
achieved by deterrence which in turn was achieved by the ability
to punish aggression. The military and their political leaders
were criticized for failing to think through what is required if
deterrence fails? The war plan itself was thought to be the
finished product.
Under the Reagan administration, the military clearly
addressed the execution of war plans; leading in turn to
criticism over plans to fight and win nuclear wars. To mollify
critics, the Commander-in-Chief himself declared that there could
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be no winners in a nuclear war. Yet military planners needed to
think through all the options so that they would be able to offer
sound military advise if ever required.
Strategic management is also successful in the programming
side of military planning. Here the DoD is executing plans
successfully every day of the year. All of the elements required
of strategic management are found on the programming side but the
lack of crossover to the policy side is astonishing. The
services do a good job in educating future program managers in
concepts of strategic management but generally without the
political-military background that would let them understand why
forces are required in the first place.
The programming side of the military tends to view the pure
politico-military planner as operating in an unconstrained dream
world whose function is to create the wish list for what they
would like if they could have it all. The politico-military
planner does in fact create such lists, but another group of them
works solely on current or near term plans that are totally
dependent upon the output of the programming process. The
disconnect appears to be in the front end - between determining
requirements and creating programs.
Case studies of successful strategic management that we will
use for this study will probably include the early Navy General
Board, the post-war Marshall Plan, PPBS, and NASA. We may look
at a few foreign examples of successful strategic management
during the next few years; dependent upon the outcome of those
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plans. The focus of the inquiry will be on what elements were
present in those nations that could successfully manage an
overall defense plan that are not present in the U.S.
Efforts Planned for Fiscal Year 1989
Fiscal year 1989 will have the investigators refining case
studies, looking for parallels in historical cases to today's
situations, reviewing lessons from industry to see how they have
fared when applied to government (PPBS and competitive strategies
will deserve special attention) . The major question is whether
lessons from industry can be actually applied to DoD or just used
for education?
The above will form the basis of the technical report
textbook which we will develop over the next two years. The
basic outline that we have adopted for the first draft of our
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The investigators will look to business and the social
sciences to ascertain to what extent alternative models and
principles from these areas can be applied to DoD strategic
management. Recognizing that there are significant differences in
DoD that make direct applications difficult, the investigators
also will examine to what extent these models and principles, if
they do transfer, need to be modified or amended before they can
be applied to public sector strategic management. The objective
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of this phase will be to thoroughly investigate alternative
models currently used in the private sector and in the social
sciences to determine what can be applied to an organization that
is not only structurally very different, but must contend with a
very highly unpredictable, national and global socio-political
environment.
Fall Quarter FY-89: Professor Tritten will continue
research on current historical DoD case studies. Research on
intelligence materials will be folded into the project.
Professor Roberts teaches MN 4105 and further refines student
reports. Professors Tritten and Whitt will supervise one thesis
that will be used for this project.
Winter Quarter FY-89: Professor Roberts will continue
research on strategic management in the public sector and the
fold in research on social science models into the project.
Professor Tritten will teach a revised Net Assessment seminar, NS
4251.
.Spring Quarter FY-89: Professor Tritten will teach th
revised seminar in strategic planning, NS 4230, for the second
time and revise the interim technical reports. Professor Roberts
will teach the revised seminar on strategic management, MN 4105,
for first group of NSA students. As a payback for her services,
the NSA department will provide one faculty member to teach a
basic organizational theory course for management students. NSA
Programs curricular review by OP-06.
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Summer Quarter FY-89: Professor Roberts will continue
research on strategic management in the public sector and will
meet with sponsors and continue interviews in Washington.
Professor Tritten will review student reports and refine a
revised technical report.
Expected Efforts During Fiscal Year 1990
The final stage of the study will be to determine what forms
of strategic management might be applied to DoD and to discuss
the application of gaming, simulation, and other techniques that
can assist decision-makers in dealing with uncertainty and the
future. The final stage will include the preparation of a final
draft technical report summarizing all these issues. The project
is expected to be a three-year effort and will include the team-
teaching of a strategic planning course at NPS after each stage
of research.
Fall Quarter FY-90: Professor Tritten will continue
research and outline the final draft technical report.
Winter Quarter FY-90: Professor Roberts will continue
research on public sector strategic management and its
applications to DoD, making inputs to the final draft technical
report.
Spring Quarter FY-90: Draft of final technical report will
be prepared and sent to sponsors and other interested parties.
Strategic management and strategic planning courses taught and
case studies revised. Sponsor to visit NPS and meet with Pis and
students.
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Summer Quarter FY-90: Professors Tritten and Roberts on
research to prepare final technical report after receipt of
sponsor's comments on draft. Submission of final technical
report and distribution.
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IV. SUMMARY OF OUR CHALLENGING MISSION
To put into perspective what has been described above, we
would like to leave the reader with a series of questions. In
addition to getting some feedback from you and using these
questions as a point of our discussion, these questions will
give you some understanding of the enormity of our task:
We can teach the principles of strategic management but how
do we teach our students to apply them to DOD? Current Navy
efforts in this area (OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5000), for example,
acknowledges that long-range planning is critically important for
the future, while it recognizes that decentralized long-range
planning is the norm. And from our perspective, what is
currently in place is focused on specific programs not on the
overall strategic management of the Navy as a whole organization.
Perhaps we should concern ourselves with strategically
managing even smaller and smaller organizational units. After
all, business and industry rarely and successfully conduct
strategic management at the corporate level, but instead tend to
manage strategically at the divisional level, if at all. But what
should that level be? If we select smaller and smaller
organizations or organizational units, do we not violate the very
principles that started this effort in the first place -- greater
integration and coordination of the whole defense effort through
some kind of strategic management process?
Thus, we are caught in a major dilemma. How can we apply
strategic management principles to a system that is very
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decentralized, made up of semi-autonomous units which ideally
should coordinate their efforts, but practically because of their
size (and their separate traditions and the American culture
which insists on shared power among the major branches of
government) probably will have an enormous difficulty in doing
so? How and with what means and mechanisms can we develop an
integrated Defense policy? What will it take to get us there?
We are beginning our efforts at NPS by educating students to
the nature of the problem and introducing them to the skills and
tools they well need in the strategic management process. In the
meantime, we invite the reader to help us develop some solutions
to this thorny and critical problem area in which we, as citizens
and taxpayers, all have a stake.
It is important to note, however, that this reform effort is
not being done by contractors outside of system but by government
employees who have a legitimate role to play in strategic
planning and strategic management. Implementing the reform
recommendations will be that much easier and doubly so since the
parties who will make the recommendations will also be those who
have to execute them.
If any readers have suggestions on the content of this
report, the direction that the project is taking, or would like
to be included in future efforts, please contact either of the
two investigators:
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Associate Professor James Tritten
Code 56 Tr
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
(408) 646-2521 AVN 878-2521
Associate Professor Nancy Roberts
Code 5 4Re
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
(408) 646-2742 AVN 878-2742
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APPENDIX A
Catalog Description of NPS Strategic Planning Courses
NS 0810 THESIS RESEARCH (0 - 0).
Students conducting thesis research will enroll in this course.
NS 1010 ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
(0 - 0).
Preparatory data analysis programmed text course offered via
Office of Continuing Education.
NS 3000 MILITARY HISTORY, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (4 - 0).
Study of history of war since 1815. Course emphasizes the
connection between the events of war, strategy and policy in the
international system of states. The class compares the military
experience of the leading world powers, seeking to demonstrate
how war has become total in the modern age. The different
national experiences with policy, strategy, operations and
tactics form the central focus of the course. Students are
expected to prepare an individual project on a selected problem
of the history of war for presentation to the class.
NS 3012 FORECASTING AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING
(4 - 0)
Survey of the methods and techniques used in conducting research,
hypothesis testing and forecasting. The focus is on those
national security issues related to the strategic planning and
international negotiations process. Topics include policy
research design, generation and statistical analysis of data, and
forecasting techniques such as trend analysis and extrapolation,
cross-impact matrix analysis, probabilistic forecasting,
structuring techniques, delphi expert judgment and genius
forecasting, scenario building, and simulation modeling to
include war gaming. PREREQUISITE: NS 1010
NS 3022 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING (4-0)
Survey of concepts, processes and historical developments which
define the present and future international environment for
strategic planning, international negotiations, and intelligence.
This course will utilize the systems approach to integrate the
strategic planning effort at the institutional level with
regional and global factors. These factors include actors
interactions, and environmental components such as technology,
ideologies, value systems, geopolitics, and ecology.
NS 3030 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY/DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
(4 - 0)
An institutional and functional analysis of the national and
international factors which shape U.S. defense policy.
Attention in the course is focused on two major areas: 1) the
decision making process, including the legislative-executive
budgetary process, as well as the influence of bureaucratic
politics and interest group participation upon defense decisions;
2) the problems of strategic choice, including security
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assistance, threat analysis, net assessment, deterrence theory,
and limited war.
NS 3050 MARITIME STRATEGY (4 - 0).
A policy-oriented analysis of the maritime and naval components
of our national military strategy. Introduces to the student the
relationship of war at sea and other uses of the sea to what
happens ashore. Introduces to the student the use of maritime
assets for political gain and the impact of technology on
maritime roles, missions, and capabilities. Students are
expected to prepare an individual project for presentation to the
class. PREREQUISITE: NS 3000 or permission of Instructor.
NS 3230 STRATEGIC PLANNING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
(4 - 0).
The focus of this course will be on long term strategic planning
and will include such topics as: Strategic Goal Analysis,
national and transnational power assessment, analysis of the
decision making and administrative processes at the national
level, indigenous constraints on the policy process, forecasting
and future research techniques and the application of the
concepts of strategic planning to the national defense effort.
PREREQUISITE: NS 3030.
NS 3250 DEFENSE RESOURCES ALLOCATION. (4 - 1).
A presentation of the concepts, principles and methods of defense
resources allocation as they pertain to planning, programming,
budgeting and related activities. Emphasis is placed on the
analytical aspects of decision making drawn from the disciplines
of management theory, economics and quantitative analysis. The
laboratory sessions include problems and case studies in which
the concepts and methods are applied to illustrative situations.
NS 3280 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. (4 - 0).
An interdisciplinary course which covers both the technology and
political influences of nuclear weapon systems with the foreign
policies of the major powers and the political blocs from 1945 to
the present.
NS 3400 DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
(4 - 0).
An examination of the role of domestic factors shaping Soviet
international conduct, including historical influences, ideology,
political and economic systems, nationalities and political
culture.
NS 3410 SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY. (4 - 0).
A follow up course to NS 3400. Examination of the evolution of
Soviet national security policy. Introductory part of the course
deals with pre-World War II roots of Soviet national security
policy and evolution of Soviet national security decision-making.
The main part of the course deals with Soviet national security
policy from the end of World War II to the present, with special
emphasis on US-Soviet relations, relations between the USSR and
China, and Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe and the Third
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World (Middle East, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan) .PREREQUISITE:
NS 3400 or consent of instructor.
NS 3450 SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. (4 - 0).
Examination of international and external factors conditioning
Soviet military doctrine and strategy and their development
through the Stalin, Khruschev and Brezhnev eras and beyond.
Emphasis is on contemporary Soviet strategic concepts and
strategy: surprise and deception, war-fighting capabilities,
external role of the Soviet armed forces, strategy for nuclear
war, Warsaw Treaty Organization strategy, and Soviet naval
strategy in the Third World.
NS 3452 THE NAVY IN SOVIET STRATEGY. (4 - 0).
Examination of the roles played by the Soviet Navy, Merchant
Marine, fishing fleet, and Oceanological establishment in
securing the objectives of the Soviet Government. Topics
include: geographic factors affecting Soviet ocean strategies;
non-naval strategy trends; international and domestic factors
affecting post-1953 naval strategy, development of Soviet naval
warfare capabilities; doctrinal and functional analysis of post-
1953 trends in naval strategy; command structure; personnel
training; law of the sea positions; U.S. -Soviet naval interaction.
PREREQUISITE: NS 3450 or permission of Instructor and SECRET
clearance.
NS 3902 MODERN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL TERRORISM. (4 - 0).
Study of the general historical framework of modern revolution to
include systematical analysis of the development of modern
revolutionary situations. Examination of the more important
revolutions of modern times, including study of the historical
events, testing of the methods of systematic analysis, with
emphasis on revolutionary tactics, e.g., political terrorism.
NS 3960 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR. (4 - 0).
An introduction to the principles of international law including
origins, sources, sovereignty, states, territory, jurisdiction,
persons, treaties, settlement of disputes, and the Law of the
Sea. The law of war is analyzed as it is to be observed and
enforced by the Armed Forces of the United States.
Special attention is paid to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the
Navy's Law of Naval Warfare and the Army's Law of Land Warfare.
NS 4220 THREAT ANALYSIS AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT. (4-0)
An appreciation for other threats to U.S. interests and those of
its allies including; Muslim fundamentalism, the Arab/Israeli
conflict the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, threats to the
Pacific Rim including Philippine insurgency, North Korea,
Vietnam, Central and South American instability, and Africa.
Functional threats will also be examined; technological
breakthroughs, chemical and biological warfare, as well as the
military uses of space. Graded on a Pass/Fail basis only.
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NS 4230 SEMINAR IN STRATEGIC PLANNING. (4 - 0).
Advanced study in the concept and methods of long-range defense
forecasting, strategic planning, strategic analysis, and
strategic management with respect to the military services, the
JCS, DoD and their interaction with the Department of State, NSC,
President, and Congress. Students will research and report on
major strategic issue/planning process which has or has had a
significant long-term implications. PREREQUISITE: Secret
clearance and NS 3030, 3230, 3250, 4261, & 4500 or permission of
instructor.
NS 4251 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND NET
ASSESSMENT. (4 - 0).
Comparative analysis of trends in U.S. and Soviet security
policies, military forces, manpower, and capabilities. Special
attention is paid to familiarizing students with original source
material and major elements in current controversial national
security issues. Topics covered include nuclear capabilities and
doctrine, BMD and air defense, civil defense, combined arms
employment, NATO Warsaw Pact military balance, naval forces, and
trends in the U.S. and Soviet economies, especially as they may
affect the allocation of resources to defense. PREREQUISITE: TOP
SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
information.
NS 4261 SURVEY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES. (4 - 0).
An extensive survey of the classical and contemporary literature
on strategic thinking: national objectives and strategic
alternatives; deterrence, counterforce, arms control, counter
insurgency, compellence; components and rules of the
international strategic system; arms competitions, nuclear
proliferation, terrorism. Student projects on current strategic
problems are a major component of the course. PREREQUISITE: NS
3020.
NS 4280 ADVANCED TOPICS IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE.
(4 - 0).
A follow-up course to NS 3280 that examines advanced issues in
nuclear strategy, strategic and crisis stability, and deterrence.
In addition to advanced theoretical issues of deterrence, this
course will specifically investigate the role and importance of
nuclear force planning and strategy formulation in deterrence,
stability, and foreign policy implementation. Some of this
analysis will be done using both static measurement models and
dynamic computer nuclear exchange modeling. PREREQUISITE: NS
3280 or permission of the Instructor; SECRET clearance.
NS 4451 ADVANCED TOPICS IN SOVIET NAVAL AFFAIRS. (4 - 0).
Advanced study and research in Soviet naval and maritime affairs.
Topics include: decision-making processes, scenarios, warfare
capabilities and support systems, missions methodology, gaming,
and U.S. Soviet naval interactions. PREREQUISITE: NS 3452, TOP
SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
information, or permission of Instructor.
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NS 4500 SEMINAR IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. (4 - 0).
An advanced study of the underlying assumptions and objectives of
American security and foreign policy. The core of the course is
an in-depth analysis of the American national interest in the
international context. Students are required to write a major
seminar paper on American national interests in a specific
country or region.
NS 4950 SEMINAR IN ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY. (4 - 0).
An analysis of international negotiation processes as related to
the control of armaments, including a review of the history of
modern arms control efforts, examination of the domestic
political context of arms limitation, the implications of
international law relevant to treaty negotiations, ratification
and enforcement, the intellectual contributions of scientists to
the development of arms control theory, and a review of selected
substantive issues with respect to security concerns,
verification capabilities and compliance measures. PREREQUISITES:
NS 3450 and 3900 or consent of Instructor and SECRET clearance.
MN 4105 MANAGEMENT POLICY. (4 - 0).
Study and analysis of complex managerial situations requiring
comprehensive integrated decision making. Topics include
operational and strategic planning, policy formulation, executive
control, environmental adaptation, and management of change.
Case studies in both the public and private sectors are used.
PREREQUISITE: Open only to students in the final quarter of an




Assistant Professor Jim Tritten QUI AY-88
M & W 1010-1200 Root Hall 228 Spring
Seminar in Strategic Planning
NS 4230 (4-0)
Course Description : Advanced study in the concept and methods of
long-range defense planning and analysis, particularly with
respect to iterative aggregation and synthesis in the Military
Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the National
Security Council/White House, and the Congress. Students are
expected to research and report on a major strategic
issue/strategic planning process/case study which has/has a
significant long-term impact. PREREQUISITE: SECRET clearance and
NS 3230 or permission of Instructor.
Course Objectives : By the end of the course, the student will
demonstrate that he comprehends and can apply his knowledge of
general strategic planning by an analysis of major issues in
strategic planning and selected case studies. Student will
demonstrate that he has mastered the differences between the
terms strategic planning, strategic management, strategic
nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, and strategy, and between
planning for programming, war planning, and execution of plans,
and between declaratory planning and real planning.
Clearance Requirement : The course is taught at the unclassified
level. Certain of the case studies materials and a seminar
discussions of actual war planning will involve classified
material; hence a SECRET clearance is required.
Texts Purchased by Student :
(1) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-
Soviet Contest , 1986
(2) Perry Smith, Jerrold Allen, John Stewart, & F. Douglas
Whitehouse, Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for
National Security , 1987
(3) William Ascher & William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning
Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity , 1983
Texts Provided by Instructor :
(1) Carl H. Builder, The Army in Strategic Planning: Who
Shall Bell the Cat? , 1987
(2) Joint Staff Officer's Guide - 1986 , AFSC Pub 1
(3) James L. George, Robert E. Sheridan, Francis J. West,
Michael E. Sherman, Review of USN Long-Range Planning, CRM 85-
69/July 1985
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Recommended Texts Provided by Instructor (no readings assigned):
( 1
)
National Security Strategy of the United States , January
1988
( 2) Discriminate Deterrence; Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy , January 1988
Grade : Based upon in-class written assignments, classroom
presentation and participation, written assignments, and the
seminar paper.
Written Assignments : Two-page think pieces will be reguired
throughout the course in addition to the seminar paper. These
are to be original thought with no footnotes or additional
research reguired. Occasionally papers will be reguired that are
to be written in the classroom.
Seminar Paper : A major research paper is to be written that
addresses a specific case study in successful/failed strategic
planning/ strategic management. The objective of the paper is to
identify and describe the system used for planning and the system
of execution/implementation of that plan and to then identify
those elements of the planning/management system that were
present and resulted in success/failure. The papers must analyze
and not merely describe; i.e. a descriptive paper will be
returned as incomplete. The annotated bibliography will be
considered in the grade assigned to the paper. Papers should
adhere to the following outline:
I - Background description of the international or national
context of events at the time, what was it that was being
planned, how did the planning process end (with a published
study/execution of plan etc.), and if implemented, was the
strategic management effort generally successful (or not). (2
pages maximum)
II - Description of the strategic planning/management system.
This should not be an especially detailed description of the
substance of the issues being planned but rather a description of
the system for planning. (3 pages maximum).
Ill - Key assumptions made by key personnel or in the plan and
constraints on the planning/management system. Were there common
goals and objectives that all parties agreed to? (3 pages
maximum)
.
IV - Analysis of the key elements of the plan/execution
system that were crucial to success/failure. (Open ended size)
V - Annotated Bibliography (Open ended size)
Due NLT Friday 17 June 1988
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Class Schedule
Monday 28 March - Course Introduction
-Course overview and requirements presented by instructor
-Seminar paper topics discussed
-Instructor provided texts passed out
-Case Study in Strategic Planning: videotape Beyond War
-In class exercise: outline of Beyond War strategic plan
(handwritten answers to the following questions to be turned in
at end of class period with xerox copies returned to students to
be used in at-home analysis)
(i) What is the problem?
( 2
)
What is the goal of the Beyond War group?
(3) How does the group expect to reach their goal?
(4) What is the expected end result of Beyond War's efforts?
Wednesday 30 March - Basics of Long-range Political-Military
Planning
-Readings: Smith pp. xv-22, Builder pp. 1-11 , Brzezinski pp.
xiii-29
-Paper due: Analysis of (compare and contrast) the political-
military futures as advocated by Beyond War and Brzezinski:
can we plan plan for either of these? Paper to parallel class
discussion.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion of their viewing
of the Beyond War videotape and Brzezinski relative to: (1) the
future seen by each, (2) the methodologies used by each to
identify their versions of the future, and (3) how realistic
are each's strategic plan? Is the U.S. in a zero-sum or non-
zero sum game with the USSR? Students/ faculty from UC Santa
Cruz have been invited to participate in discussion.
Monday 4^ April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning &
Forecasting Part 1^
-Readings: Smith pp. 49-92, Ascher pp. xi-93
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on (1) the role
of the analyst in support of political-military policy makers,
(2) the types of methodologies that are available to help staffs
and decision-makers, and (3) elements of a basic strategy.
-Students will select their seminar research paper topics by this
date
Wednesday 6 April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning &
Forecasting Part II
-Readings: Ascher pp. 94-157
-Paper due: Analysis of all the types of methodologies for
developing alternative futures likely to be of interest to
strategic planners in the DoN/DoD with strengths and weaknesses
of each method highlighted and likelihood that anyone in the
DoN/DoD would pay attention to each. Paper to be in the form of
a matrix. Use all methodologies found in texts.
-Class discussion: Student views of paper topic and overall
efforts to reduce uncertainty and aid decision-makers.
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Monday 11 April 2. Alternative Futures
-Readings: Brzezinski pp. 30-144
-Class discussion: Students to lead discussion on how to identify
the future that we plan for. To include inability to identify
all political variables, inability to describe an international
system, inability to predict, and need to plan anyway. Hov»
might varying methodologies help predict?
-In class exercise: students will outline a Soviet scenario for
a general war or a specific campaign to be used in a war game.
Wednesday 13 April - Prescriptive Strategic Planning
-Readings: Smith pp. 93-133, Brzezinski pp. 145-250
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on what should
American goals be in peacetime, crises, or war? Do goals derive
from the threat, expected resources, or existing plans? Do we
prepare for the worst/best/most likely case? Does answer vary
in programming vs. war planning or declaratory vs. real
planning?
-In class exercise: disarmament exercise.
Monday 18 April - Descriptive DoD Strategic Planning
-Readings: Joint Staff Officer' s Guide chapters 5-7, 10
-Paper due: Analysis of how likely it is that the current or
expected elements in the DoD forecasting and planning process
are capable of providing good advice and a system for strategic
planning/management to decision-makers. Paper is not to be
descriptive.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how likely is
it that decision-makers are well served by the current system?
DRMEC faculty have been invited to participate in the
discussion.
Wednesday 20 April 2. Problems with Present DoD Strategic Planning
-Readings: Ascher pp. 245-261, Smith pp. 23-48, Builder pp. 12-
98, Norman Bailey & Stefan Halper, "National Security for Whom?"
-Discussion: Students will lead discussion on how we can
integrate the needs of the varying multi-purpose organizations
within the DoD and the realities of the American political
system to have an effective long-range planning process.
Monday 25 April - War Planning
-Readings: Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict
Termination Thought" Strategy," LTG John Cushman, "Strategic
Planning in the Military," SECDEF Statement to SASC 12 Jan 87,
pp. 1-3, & Allan Millett, et. al., "The Effectiveness of
Military Organizations"
-Paper due: What should the major goals be for the U.S. and USSR
if they engage in a major war? Each geographic area of world
must be covered and prioritized.
-Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how to decide
the goals for the U.S. in a major war with the USSR and how we
should choose to allocate our military resources to the varying
theaters of military operations. Is war termination a zero-sum
or non-zero sum game?
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Wednesday 27 April - Business & Public Sector Strategic Planning
-Readings: LaRue Hosmer, "Introduction to Strategic Management/'
George pp. iii-iv & appendix D, Kenichi Ohmae The Mind of the
Strategist pp. xi-xiii, p. 1-41, 76-88, 269-277, LTC Al Gropman
"Long-range Planning," pp. 49-54, John Bryson & Robert
Einsweiler, "Strategic Planning," John Bryson & William
Roering, "Applying Private-Sector Strategic Planning in the
Public Sector"
-Guest lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of
Administrative Sciences
-Class discussion: What types of business and public sector
planning concepts are applicable to the DoN/DoD and why are they
applicable?
Monday 2 May - Research time for students




-National Security Strategy published by White House
-Discriminate Deterrence report
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on role of line organizations and special blue-ribbon
panels in strategic planning process.
Wednesday 11 May - Student Presentations
-McNamara era and the start of PPBS in DoD
-Competitive Strategies
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on likelihood of business models being successful
within DoN/DoD in either programming or war planning.
Monday 16 May - Student Presentations
-Navy Long-range strategic planning
-Air Force Long-range strategic planning
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on role of service long-range planning efforts within
context of overall Executive Branch/DoD efforts.
Wednesday 18 May 2. Strategic Management/ Implementation
-Readings: John Bryson, "A Strategic Planning Process for Public
& Non-profit Organizations," Richard Hamermesh, "The Forces
Shaping Strategic Decision Making," and Thomas Wheelen & J. David
Hunger, "Strategy Implementation," & "Evaluation and Control."
-Guest Lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of
Administrative Sciences
-Class discussion: Implementing plans and necessary
infrastructure
Monday 23 May - Student Presentations
-Navy General Board
-War Planning between WWI & WWII: the Rainbow Plans
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements found in general strategic planning
and war planning of the inter-war years.
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Wednesday 25 May - Student Presentations
-Seaplan 2000
-The Maritime Strategy
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in designing a general strategic plan
for the Navy in recent years
Monday 30 May - Holiday/Research Time
Wednesday 1 June - Student Presentations
-NASA
-SST
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failures of these non-DoD
cases.
Monday 6 June - Student Presentations
-The B-36/USS United States controversy
-Strategic mineral stockpiling
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.
Wednesday 8 June - Student Presentations
-Oil stockpiling
-Marshall Plan
-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead
discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.
Friday 10 June - Wrap Up
-Readings: Berend Bruins, "Should Naval Officers be
Strategists?", Businessweek "The New Breed of Strategic
Planner," Henry Mintzberg, "Crafting Strategy," & Lincoln
Bloomfield, "Anticipating the Future: Foreign Policy Planning"
-Class Discussion: Should naval officers be strategists?
-Guest participant: LTG/Dr. Robert Gard USA (Ret.), President of
the Monterey Institute of International Studies
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APPENDIX C
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL PROFESSOR NANCY ROBERTS
MN 4105 OFFICE: IN 216
FALL TERM 1989 PHONE: 646-2742
OFFICE HOURS:
T & W 3-5 AND
BY APPOINTMENT
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
I. COURSE MATERIALS:
John Bryson. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit
Organizations . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.
Philip Heymann. The Politics of Public Management . New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
Quinn, J.B., Mintzberg, H. James, R.M. The Strategy
Process: Concepts, Contexts , and Cases . Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988.
Other materials handed out in class.
II. COURSE DESCRIPTION:
This course deals with the strategic management of the
total enterprise. Strategic decisions are those that define the
major areas of the firm's (or organization's) development and the
allocation of resources to pursue strategic direction. This
course deals with strategic management because we are concerned
with both the determination of strategic direction and the
management of the strategic process. Our central focus will be
the problem identification, analysis, and action required by the
general manager to deal with strategic issues.
Strategic management is more than analysis. To be sure,
strategic analysis is a major part of this course. We will study
several analytical techniques for positioning a firm or
organization within a competitive environment. Strategic
analyses are compounded by the trade-offs inherent in any
situation. These trade-offs reflect the fact that organizations
consist of many players with multiple, competing objectives.
When dealing with these trade-offs, general managers must
confront the judgmental issues involved in establishing
organizational purpose and balancing economic and non-economic
objectives.
Strategic management requires moving beyond analysis and
trade-offs into the realm of strategic action. Once the
analytical problem of selecting a strategy has been dealt with,
we should know what to do. Knowing what to do, however, is only
part of running an organization. (Some say it's the easy part.)
Knowing how to execute the selected strategy is essential to
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success. To the extent possible in each case, we will concern
ourselves with the various combinations of systems (for example,
information, control, reward, etc.), organization structures, and
people necessary to execute a given strategy. We will test our
ideas about the relationships between strategy and these other
elements as we proceed through the course.
Our perspective in this course is that of the general
manager whose responsibility is the long-term health of the
entire organization. The key tasks involved in general
management include the detection of and adaptation to
environmental change, the procurement and allocation of
resources, the integration of activities across subparts of the
organizations, and, at the most senior levels, the determination
of purpose and the setting of the organization's direction.
General managers, from our perspective, are managers who are
in the position to make strategic decisions for the organization.
Note that such managers need to have in-depth understanding of
the generic problems in all the relevant functional areas.
Furthermore, they must be able to deal with problems and issues
at the level of the total organization and its relationships with
relevant external environments.
Successful general managers are highly competent in problem
identification and analysis and have a strong action orientation.
One purpose of this course is to provide an environment which
will allow you to develop these skills, while at the same time
gaining a conceptual understanding of the complexity of the
strategic manager's task.
Functional specialists can benefit from the general
management perspective even though they may not be general
managers. Every function's actions should be coordinated with
the overall needs of the organization. In fact, functional
specialists are the people on whom general managers often rely to
implement their strategies. Since such functional managers can
be prone to suboptimization problems, they too, need to
understand the general manager's perspective.
III. OBJECTIVES:
In this course, "knowledge" has a more pragmatic meaning.
Knowledge here is the ability or wisdom to take appropriate
action in a changing reality, rather than a collection of facts
about a static world. The course objectives therefore include:
1
.
Development and reinforcement of a general management
point of view -- the capacity to view an organization from an
overall perspective in the context of its environment.
2. Development of an understanding of fundamental concepts
in strategic management: the levels and components of strategy;
value creation; competitive analysis; and organizational
evolution.
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3. Integration of the knowledge gained in previous core
courses and understanding of what part of that knowledge is
useful to general managers.
4. Development of those skills and knowledge peculiar to
general management and the general manager's job that have not
been covered in previous functional courses.
5
.
Development of an awareness of the various impacts of
external environmental forces on an organization's strategy.
6 Practice in distinguishing between basic causes of
organization problems and attendant symptoms.
7. Practice in working out business strategies and
implementation plans.
8. Development of habits of orderly, analytical thinking
and skill in reporting conclusions effectively in both written
and oral form.
9. Familiarity with some of the practical realities of
running different types of organizations.
IV. ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVES: COURSE REQUIREMENTS
Like any general management situation, this course includes
individual performance evaluation and feedback regarding your
demonstrated ability to learn, apply, and expand on the materials
that will be covered in class. These evaluations, selected to
aid in reaching the course objectives, will be based on class
participation and written work.
Class Participation
This course will be taught by the case method. (See note on
the case method in Quinn) . The case method requires that a
student be present for and participate in class discussions in
order to develop problem solving skills and to stimulate other
forms of "learning". Therefore, I will expect you to participate
actively in case discussions.
In a typical class, one or more students would be asked to
start the class by answering a specific question or discussing a
specific issue. Preparation of the case (including the
assignment questions) should be sufficient to handle such a lead-
off assignment. After a few minutes of initial analysis, we will
open the discussion to the rest of the class. As a group, we
will then try to build a complete analysis of the situation and
address the problems and issues presented in the case. We will
also spend time talking about the implementation of those
recommendations and some of the complexities of effecting change
in strategic management situations.
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Most general managers spend very little time reading, and
even less time writing reports. The vast majority of their
interactions with others are verbal. For this reason, the
development of verbal skills is given a high priority in this
course. The classroom should be considered a laboratory in which
you can test your ability to convince your peers of the
correctness of your approach to complex problems and of your
ability to achieve the desired results through the use of that
approach. Some of the things that have an impact on effective
class participation are the following:
1. Is the participant a good listener?
2. Are the points that are made relevant to the discussion?
Are they linked to the comments of others?
3
.
Do the comments add to our understanding of the
situation?
4. Do the comments show evidence of analysis of the case?
5. Does the participant distinguish among different kinds





6. Is there a willingness to share?
7. Is there a willingness to be creative and to test new
ideas, or are all comments "safe"? (For example,
repetition of case facts without analysis and
conclusions)
.
8. Is the participant willing to interact with other class
members?
9. Do comments clarify and highlight the important aspects
of earlier comments and lead to a clearer statement of
the concepts being covered?
The questions above deal with the process of class
participation. Of equal or greater concern is the content of
what you say. As will be noted subsequently, class participation
will be a major portion of your grade in this course.
Group Project.
Working in groups of , students will select one topic on
which to write: The Navy Context; The JCS Context; The DoD
Context; The Nasa Context; DoD and the Management of Change;
Maritime Strategy; Competitive Strategy; and National Security
Strategy. Your group is to prepare a written report (15 pages,
double- spaced) that is to be turned in on the day of your class
presentation. The report is to address the questions in the
syllabus for that day.
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Let us use the Navy Context as an example of what is required in
the group project. Some of your report will be descriptive in
nature (e.g. identifying the current strategic management efforts
in the Navy). Other parts (the majority of the report) will
require critical analysis. Having a strategic management system
does not necessarily imply that it functions well or functions as
it was intended. To what extent can you separate out what people
describe is the strategic management process from how that
process actually works, or if it works at all? Critical analysis
also will be required to apply what we have learned about the
mature context in business to strategic management in the Navy.
What can be applied and what does not transfer?
In addition to your written report, your group is to prepare a
50-minute class presentation on your topic. If you will require
a reading assignment, be sure to hand it out at least one class
in advance of your presentation.
V. GRADING POLICY
The purpose of grading in this course, as in all courses, is
twofold. One is to evaluate your performance for purposes of the
academic system. The other (and more important) is to provide
you with feedback on your ability to develop, utilize, and share
your ideas and conclusions concerning the topics and situations
covered in the course.








Group Project Grades : Group projects will be given a grade for
the entire project. In addition, each student will allocate as
many as 10 or as low as points to each of the group members.
Based on the individual's contribution to the project, this
assessment will be done independently by each member of the group
and turned in to the instructor, who will average all of the
scores the individual receives. As an example, if a project was
awarded 15 points (perfect score), and the average score an
individual received was 5, the individual would receive a 20 out
of a possible 25 for the group project score. This grading
system takes both group and individual performance into account.
Grades for the groups classroom presentation will be
assessed in a similar way: 5 points for the presentation as




depending on the group's assessment.
VI. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL
Since every faculty member tends to have somewhat different
expectations as to class behavior and course norms, I'd like to
outline a few of my expectations concerning such matters.
1. Because this is a case-oriented course, I consider
attendance in every class extremely important. Please schedule
other activities (for example field trips) at other times than
MN 4105.
2. In the event that for some unavoidable reason you have
to miss one class during the guarter, I would appreciate it if
you would let me know that in advance of class. Also, if you do
miss a class, I consider it your responsibility to find out from
your classmates what materials were covered, what additional




I plan to be prepared for every class and I hope you
will do the same. Since I will call on individuals whose hands
are not raised, you should let me know before the start of the
class if some emergency has made it impossible for you to be
prepared adeguately for that class.
4. I will be happy to discuss the course, your progress, or
any other issues of concern to you on an individual basis.
The best way to see me is during my office hours, which will be
announced the first week of class. If you need to reach me at
other times, please leave a message in my Administration Sciences
mail box or call me at (646-2742) and I will get back to you as
soon as I can.
5. I consider the Honor Code to be an extremely important
part of the educational system. Group work is encouraged and
appropriate for general case preparation and for the group
assignment. However, any other written assignments and exams
must be solely your own work,
6. Given the importance of this course, I will do
everything that I can to use the class time effectively and would
ask that you do the same. This will include starting, arriving,
and ending on time.
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VII. COURSE SCHEDULE
Part I : Strategic Management
Class 1: Introduction to Course
Overview of Course and Key Terms
Case: Robin Hood pp. 145-146
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 2: Course Preparation
Reading: Quinn, Preface xi-xv
Introduction xvii-xxv
Postscript 955-961
Group Projects: Students are to sign up for and begin
to work on group project.
Class 3: What is management?: Technocratic and Political
Handouts: "The Wisdom of Difference"
"Technocratic Management versus Political
Management"
"Technocratic Systems at Work"
"Political Management Systems at Work"
Questions to think about as you are reading:
1. What are the basic characteristics of technocratic
management?
2. To what extent did your previous work/ job involve
technocratic management? Be prepared to explain.
3. What are the basic characteristics of political
management?
4. To what extent did your previous work/ job involve
political management? Be prepared to explain.
Class 4: Strategic Thinking
Readings: Quinn, chapter 1, pp. 42-50, ch 16
Case: Guns of August
Questions: At the end of the case
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Class 5: The Strategist
Readings: Quinn, chapter 2.
Case: MacArthur and the Philippines pp 147-163
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 6: Strategic Analysis
Readings: Quinn, chapter 4.
Case: Federal Express pp. 750-780
Questions: At the end of the case
Class 7: Strategic Planning
Readings: Quinn, chapter 5.
Case: Comparative Planning Systems: Litton Industries
and Texas Instruments pp. 251-269
Questions : At the end of the case
Class 8: Strategic Implementation: Organization Structure and
Systems
Readings: Quinn, chapter 6.
Case: Polaroid pp 376-397
Questions: At the end of case
Class 9: Strategic Implementation: Culture
Readings: Quinn, chapter 8
Case: H-P pp. 875-898
Questions: What are the major aspects of H-P culture?
To what extent are "Japanese Management"
principles similar to H-P principles of
management?
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Class 10: Strategic Implementation: Power
Readings: Quinn, ch 7
Case: British Steel (in class video)
Question: To what extent does power play a part in
British Steel's strategy formulation?
Class 11: Strategic Implementation: Evaluation and Control
Readings: Quinn, Evaluation of a Business Strategy,
pp. 50-57
Handouts: Wheelan and Hunger, "Evaluation and Control"
Ratios
Case: H-P pp. 875-898
Questions: At the end of the case
How would you evaluate H-P's current
strategy?
Part II: Strategic Management in Profit and Public
Organizations: A Comparison
Class 12: Strategic Management in Profit and Public
Organizations: The Similarities
Readings: Bryson, pp. xi-xv, 1-4, 11-21, 22-45, 46-
70, 199-215, 216-230
Question: What are the similarities between public
and profit organizations in terms of
strategic management?
Class 13: Strategic Management in Government Agencies,
Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences
Readings: Preface and pp. 3-105 in Politics of Public
Management , by Heymann
Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of
management in the public sector?
To what extent do these distinctive aspects
of public management make the application of
strategic management difficult? impossible?
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Class 14: Strategic Management of Government Agencies
,
Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences
Readings: pp 109-189 in Politics of Public Management
by Heymann
Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of
of management in the public sector?
To what extent do these distinctive aspects
of public management make the application of
strategic management difficult? impossible?
Part III: The Context and Achieving Configuration
Class 15: The Innovation Context: NASA
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 516-530, pp. 606-637
1
.
What are the characteristics of the innovation
context?
2 How is H-P an example of business in an
innovation context?
Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in NASA
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in NASA? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
an innovation context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in NASA?
Class 16: The Mature Context:
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 546-558.
1. What are the characteristics of the mature
context?
2. How is Exxon (pp. 457- 465) an example of business
in a mature context?
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Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in the Navy-
Readings: To Be Assigned
1
.
To what extent is strategic management practiced
in the Navy? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a mature context that can be applied to Strategic
Management in the Navy?
Class 17: The Diversified Context: DoD
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 577-605
1. What are the characteristics of the diversified
context?
2. How is GM (pp. 480-491) an example of business
in a diversified context?
Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in DoD
Readings: To Be Assigned
1 To what extent is strategic management practiced
in DoD? Who is involved? What is done? When?
Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a diversified context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in DoD?
Class 18: The Professional Context: JCS
First Part of Class:
Readings: Quinn, pp. 638-660
1. What are the characteristics of the professional
context?
2. How is Davidson Hospital (pp. 864- 869) an
example of a professional context?
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Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in JCS
Readings: To Be Assigned
1. To what extent is strategic management practiced
in the JCS? Who is involved? What is done?
Where? When? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in
a professional context that can be applied to
Strategic Management in JCS?
Class 19: Managing Transitions
Readings: Quinn, pp. 661-704
Case: DoD and The Management of Change
Questions: According to the Staff Report to the
Senate Armed Services Committee, what
changes are needed in DoD?
What is your evaluation of these changes?
Do you have alternative recommendations to
propose?
Class 20: 1. Report on Maritime Strategy
Readings : To Be Announced
Questions: What is the Maritime Strategy?
How was this strategy devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go
into the development of the maritime
strategy?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what
degree of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
2. Report on Competitive Strategies
Readings : To Be Announced
Questions: What are Competitive Strategies?
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How were these strategies devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go into
the development of competitive strategies?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what degree
of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
Class 21: 1. National Security Strategy
Readings : To Be Announced
Questions: What is the National Security Strategy ( ies)
?
How was this strategy devised? Who was
involved? To what extent did strategic
thinking and analysis and planning go into
the development of the National Security
Strategy?
To what extent has this strategy been
implemented and evaluated? With what
degree of success/failure?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of
this strategy?
2 . Alternatives for the Future
Handouts: "The United States Isn't a Company, It's not
Even Japan," pp. 169-186 in Bower
"Small May Be Beautiful, but Local Works,"
pp. 187-220 in Bower
"Who Leads," pp. 221-237 in Bower
Question: To what extent can the mechanisms Bower
introduces be applied to DoD?
Class 22: Final Exam
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VIII. JOURNALS AND REFERENCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Journals
* Academy of Management Review
* Business Week
* Fortune
* Harvard Business Review
* Journal of Business Strategy
* Journal of Contemporary Business
* Journal of General Management
* Journal of Policy Analysis and Management





* Public Administration Review
* Strategic Management Journal
* Wall Street Journal
* available in NPS Dudley Knox Library
General References
Ackoff , R.L. The Concept of Corporate Planning . New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1970.
Allison, G.T. Essence of Decision . Boston: Little, Brown &
Co., 1971.
Andrews, K.R. The Concept of Corporate Strategy . Homewood, IL:
Dow Jones-Irwin, 1980.
Ansoff, H.I. Business Strategy . New York: Penguin Books, 1969.
Corporate Strategy: An Analytic Approach to
Business Policy for Growth and Expansion . New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965.
104
, Declerk, R.P., & Hayes, R.L. From Strategic
Planning to Strategic Management . New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1976.
Barnard, C. I. The Functions of the Executive . Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1938.
Chandler, A.D. Strategy and Structure . New York: Doubleday,
1966.
Cyert, R.M. & March, J.G. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm .
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
Galbraith, J.R. & Nathanson, D.A. Strategy Implementation : The
World of Structure and Process . New York: West Publishing
Co., 1978.
Gardner, J.R. , Rachlin, R. & Sweeny, H.W.A. (eds.) Handbook of
Strategic Planning . New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986.
Hamermesh, R.G. Making Strategy Work: How Senior Managers
Produce Results . New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986.
Hamermesh, R.G. (ed.). Strategic Management New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1983.
Hofer, C.W. & Schendel. Strategy Fromulation--Analytical
Concepts . St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1976.
Lindblom, C.E. Policy Making Process . Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1968.
Lorange, P. & Vancil, R.E. Strategic Planning Systems .
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
MacMillian, I. Strategy Formulation . St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing Co., 1976.
Naylor, T.H. Corporate Planning Models . Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1979.
Paine, R. & Naumes, W.E. Strategy and Policy Formation: An
Integrative Approach . Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Co.,
1974.
Porter, Michael E., Competitive Advantage , New York: Free
Press, 1985.
Porter, Michael E., Competitive Strategy . New York: Free
Press, 1981.
Quinn, J.B. Strategic Change : Logical Incrementalism .
Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1980.
105
Schendel, D.E. Y Hoffer, C.W. (eds.). Strategic Management
:
A
New View of Business Policy and Planning . Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co. , 1979.
Steiner, G.A. Top Management Planning . New York: Macmillan
Company, 1969.
, & Miner, J.D. Management Policy and Strategy .
New York: Macmillan Co., 1977.
Thompson, A. A. Jr., & Strickland, A.J., III, Strategy Formulation
and Implementation Dallas, TX: Business Publications,
Inc., 1980.
Vickers, G. The Art of Judgment
:
A Study of Policy Making . New
York: Basic Books, 1965.
106
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abell, Derek F. and John S. Hammond, Strategic Market Planning:
Problems and Analytical Approaches , Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979, 527 pp.
Abshire, David M. , "Twenty Years in the Strategic Labyrinth,"
Washington Quarterly , Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1982, pp. 83-106.
Albritton, James P., "Memorandum for Andrew Marshall; Subj : Net
Assessment and Long Range Planning," dated June 1, 1979, 5 pp.
Alekseyev, V., "The Pentagon's Competitive Strategies," Krasnaya
Zvezda, 2nd Ed., May 4, 1988, p. 3.
Almond, Peter, "A Global Strategy for U.S. is a Goal of
Conservative Council," Washington Times, June 27, 1983, p. 5.
American Defense Preparedness Association, Proceedings from the
Special Symposium on Competitive Strategies, held at the
Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles, California, 17-18 February,
1988, 333 pp.
Anderson, Gary W. , "The Military Reformers' Prussian Model,"
Washington Post , May 21, 1984, p. 19.
Armacost, Michael H. , "Reflections on U.S. -Soviet Relations,"
address at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, May 1,
1985, reprinted as Current Policy No. 700, U.S. Department Of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 pp.
Armed Forces Journal International : Extra Edition Defense
Organization: The Need for Change, October 1985, 62 pp.
Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officer' s Guide - 1988 ,
AFSC Pub. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
July 1, 1988, 354 pp.
Armstrong, J. Scott, Long-Range Forecasting: From Crystal Ball to
Computer , 2nd Ed., New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1985, 685 pp.
Ascher, William and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning &
Forecasting , New York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983, 311
pp.
Auerbach, Stuart, "Trade Curb Ineffective, Study Says,"
Washington Post , May 9, 1983, p. 1.
Babbage, Ross, "Australian Foreign Policy: The Security
Objectives," An Introduction to Australia' s Foreign Policy ,
F.A. Mediansky and A.C. Palfreeman, Eds., unpublished draft,
December 1986, 22 pp.
107
Babbage, Ross, Dr., "Reforming the Defense Planning Process: Some
Thoughts From the Second Cross Report," unpublished paper,
February 1988, 8 pp.
Bailey, Norman and Stefan A. Halper, "National Security for
Whom?" Washington Quarterly , Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1986, p.
185-192.
Ball, Desmond, "Australian Defense Decision-Making: Actors and
Process," Politics , Vol. XIV, No. 2, November 1979, pp. 183-197,
Ball, Richard, "Assessing Your Competitor's People and
Organization," Long Range Planning , Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 32-41.
Banks, Robert L. and Steven C. Wheelwright, "Operations Versus
Strategy - Trading Tomorrow for Today," Survival Strategies for
American Industry , Alan M. Kantrow, Ed., New York, New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1984, pp. 159-173.
Barrett, Archie D. , Reappraising Defense Organization
,
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983, 325
pp.
Baylis, John, Kenneth Booth, John Garnett, and Phillip Williams,
Contemporary Strategy - Ij_ Theories and Concepts , 2nd Ed. , New
York, New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1987, 326
pp.
Baylis, John, Kenneth Booth, John Garnett, and Phillip Williams,
Contemporary Strategy - II : The Nuclear Powers , 2nd Ed. , New
York, New York, Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1987, 209
pp.
The BDM Corporation, "Evaluation of Competitive Strategies,"
briefing slides, no date, circa June 1988, 15 slides.
Beggs, James M. , "Leadership -- The NASA Approach," Long Range
Planning , Vol 17, No. 2, 1984, pp. 12-24.
Betts, Richard K. , "Conventional Strategy: New Critics, Old
Choices," International Security , Spring 1983, pp. 140-162.
Beyers, Dan, "New Priorities Plan May Cost Navy," Defense News ,
February 29, 1988, pp. 3, 19.
Bloom, Allan, The Closing of the American Mind , New York, New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1987, 392 pp.
Bloomfield, Lincoln, The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer ,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982, 236
pp.
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., "Planning Foreign Policy: Can It Be
Done?" Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 93, No. 3, Fall 1978,
pp. 369-391.
108
Borowski, Harry R. , Ed., Military Planning in the Twentieth
Century
, Proceedings of the 11th Military History Symposium 10-
12 October 1984, at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986, 464 pp.
Boschken, Herman L. and Suann L. Shumaker, "Strategic Management
and Entrepeneurship: Conditions of Appropriateness for Public
Sector Application," unpublished paper, April, 1988, 20 pp.
Bouzianis, Melissa F. , "Competitive Forces for Engineering
Thermoplastics and Their Impact on Profitability," Arthur D.
Little Decision Resources, January 1988, 12 pp.
Brodie, Bernard, "The Continuing Relevance of On War ," On War
,
Ed. and trans, by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 45-58.
Brodie, Bernard, Strategy in the Missile Age , Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965, 423 pp.
Brodie, Bernard, Charles J. Hitch, and Andrew W. Marshall, "The
Next Ten Years," Santa Monica, California: The RAND
Corporation, unpublished paper, December 30, 1954, 39 pp.
Brown, Harold, "Economic Policy and National Security," Orbis,
Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 381-390.
Brown, Harold, "Memorandum for William J. Perry; Subj : Maritime
Balance -- 1978," July 18, 1978, 2 pp.
Brown, Harold, Thinking About National Security: Defense and
Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World , Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1983, 288 pp.
Brown, Harold, "U. S. Military Leadership Needs Reform," Long
Island Newsday , April 14, 1985, p. 1.
Brown, Kenneth N. , Strategics: The Logistics-Strategy Link ,
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, March
1987, 75 pp.
Bruins, Berend D. , "Should Navy Officers Be Strategists?"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 108, No. 1, January
1982, pp. 52-56.
Bryson, John M. , Strategic Planning for Public and Non-Prof it
Organizations
:
A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining
Organizational Achievement , San Francisco, California: Jossey-
Bass, 1988, 416 pp.
Bryson, John M. , "Strategic Planning Process for Public and Non-
profit Organizations," Long Range Planning , Vol. 21, No. 1,
1988, pp. 73-81.
109
Bryson, John M. , Philip Bromiley, and Yoon Soon Jung, "Some of
the Differences Planning and Planners Can Make/' unpublished
paper, January 15, 1988, 28 pp.
Bryson, John M. and Robert C. Einsweiler, "Strategic Planning,"
APA Journal , Winter 1987, pp 6-8.
Bryson, John M. and William D. Roering, "Applying Private-Sector
Strategic Planning in the Public Sector," APA Journal , Winter
1987, pp. 9-22.
Bryson, John M. and William D. Roering, "The Initiation of
Strategic Planning By Governments," unpublished paper, February
15, 1988, 35 pp.
Bryson, John M. , Andrew H. Van de Ven, and William R. Roering,
"Strategic Planning and the Revitalization of the Public
Service," The Revitalization of the Public Service , Robert B.
Denhardt and Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Eds., Columbia, Missouri:
University of Missouri Extension Publications, 1987, pp. 55-75.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S. -Soviet
Contest , Boston, Massachusetts/New York, New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1986, 288 pp.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, "Streamlining U.S. Military Command Setup,"
The Wall Street Journal , June 20, 1985, p. 28.
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Henry A. Kissinger, Fred C. Ikle, and
Albert Wohlstetter, "Discriminate Deterrence Won't Leave Europe
Dangling," International Herald Tribune , February 24, 1988.
Builder, Carl H. , The Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who
Shall Bell the Cat? , R-3513-A, Santa Monica, California: The
RAND Corporation, April 1987, 102 pp.
Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Fundamentals
of U.S. Foreign Policy , Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
State, March 1988, 97 pp.
Byron, John L. , "Reorganization of U.S. Armed Forces,"
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983, 19 pp.
Callahan, Leslie G. , Jr., "Communication Between the Military and
the Scientist," thesis abstract and briefing slides,
Washington, D.C., Industrial College of the Armed Services,
March 23, 1964, 20 pp.
Carlucci, Frank C, Annual Report to the Congress—Fiscal Year
1989 ," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1988, pp. 115-118.
Carlucci, Frank C, "Competitive Strategies Report to the
Committee on Armed Services," transcript, January 15, 1988, 5
pp.
110
Carlucci, Frank C, "Memorandum for the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Under Secretaries of Defense, Assistant Secretaries of
Defense, General Counsel, Assistants to the Secretary of
Defense, Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands;
Subj : The Planning Phase of the DoD PPB System," no date, 3 pp.
Cartwright, T. J., "The Lost Art of Planning," Long Range
Planning , Vol. 20, No. 2, 1987, pp. 92-99.
Center for Defense Information, "What Should we Defend? A New
Military Strategy for the United States," The Defense Monitor
,
Vol. XVII, No. 4, 1988, 8 pp.
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service
Institute, U.S. Department of State, "Thinking About World
Change: An Approach to Long Range Assessment," no date, circa
Summer 1988, 16 pp.
Cimbala, Stephen J., Ed., National Security Strategy: Choices and
Limits , New York, New York: Praeger Scientific, 1984, 371 pp.
Clark, Asa A. and Richard M. Pious, "Waging War: Structural vs.
Political Efficiency," Armed Forces & Society , Vol. 14, No. 1,
Fall 1987, pp. 129-147.
Clark, William, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Georgetown University, 21 May 1982,
White House press release, 11 pp.
Clarkson, Albert, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New
Applications of Information Technology , Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1981, 179 pp.
Clausewitz, Karl von, On War , O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., New
York, New York, The Modern Library, 1943, 641 pp.
Coker, Christopher, "Discriminate Deterrence and the Alliance,"
Strategic Review , Vol. XVI, No. 2, Spring 1988, pp. 51-59.
Collins, John M. , Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices ,
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1973, 338 pp.
Collins, John M. , U.S. Defense Planning: A Critigue , Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, 337 pp.
Committee on Civilian-Military Relationships, An Analysis of
Proposed Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization , Indianapolis,
Indiana: Hudson Institute, September 17, 1984, 73 pp.
Competitive Strategies Office, U.S. Department of Defense,
"Competitive Strategies Concept," briefing slides, no date,
circa July 1987, 15 pp.
Ill
Competitive Strategies Office, U.S. Department of Defense,
"Competitive Strategies Fact Sheet," unpublished paper,
February 1988, 3 pp.
Competitive Strategies Office, U.S. Department of Defense,
"Competitive Strategies Fact Sheet," unpublished paper,
July 1988, 3 pp.
Competitive Strategies Office, U.S. Department of Defense,
"Competitive Strategies Primer," unpublished paper, 15 March
1988, 22 pp.
Competitive Strategies Office, U.S. Department of Defense, "What
is Competitive Strategies?" briefing slides, no date, circa
June 1988, 12 slides.
Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990s and
Beyond , Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May
1988, 85 pp.
Conine, Ernest, "A Strategic Study Worth Another Look," Los
Angeles Times , February 2, 1988, p. 11-17.
Conquest, Robert, et. al., Defending America: Toward a New Role
in the Post-Detente World , New York, New York: Basic Books,
Inc. , 1977, 255 pp.
Cornish, Edward, Ed. The Great Transformation : Alternative
Futures for Global Society , Bethesda, Maryland: World Future
Society, 1983, 160 pp.
Cornish, Edward, The Study of the Future, Bethesda, Maryland:
World Future Society, 1977, 307 pp.
Costello, Daniel J., "Planning for War: A History of the General
Board of the Navy 1900-1914, doctoral dissertation, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Flethcher School of Law and Diplomacy, October
1, 1968, 348 pp.
Crackel, Theodore J., "On the Making of Lieutenants and
Colonels," Public Interest , No. 76, Summer 1984, pp. 18-30.
Craig, Gordon A., "Summitry: a Historic Wasteland," Los Angeles
Times, June 26, 1984, Part II, p. 5.
Cushman, John H. , "Bigger Role urged for Defense Dept. in
Economic Policy," New York Times, October 19, 1988, p. 1.
Cushman, John H. , "Strategic Planning in the Military," Handbook
of Strategic Planning , J.R. Gardner, et. al., Eds., New York,
New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1986, pp. 26.1-26.20.
112
Davis, Donald E. and Walter S. G. Kohn, "Lenin's 'Notebook on
Clausewitz' ," Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual , Vol. 1, David
R. Jones, Ed., Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International
Press, 1977, pp. 188-229.
Davis, Gene H. , "The Three R's of Air Force Planning," The
Bureaucrat , Vol. 11, No. 2, Summer 1982, pp. 51-53.
Davis, Vincent, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy
Cases , Denver, Colorado: The Social Science Foundation and
Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series of
World Affairs, University of Denver, Monograph 3 - 1966-67,
Vol. 4, 1967, 54 pp.
Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force, Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, "Final Report of
the Defense Science Board 1988 Summer Study on The Defense
Industrial and Technology Base," Vol. I, Washington, D.C.,
October 1988, 78 pp.
Defense Science Board Task Force, Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Research and Engineering, "Report on Strategic
Planning and the Maritime Balance: An Experiment," Washington,
D.C., November 1979, 31 pp.
de Geus, Arie P., "Planning as Learning," Harvard Business
Review , Vol. 66, No. 2, March-April 1988, pp. 70-74.
Despres, John, "An Economic Approach to Long-Term Competition,"
unpublished paper, Spring 1972, 9 pp.
Dibb, Paul, The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower ,
Urbana/Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1986,
293 pp.
Dingman, Roger, "Strategic Planning and the Policy Process:
American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945-1950," Naval War
College Review , Vol. XXXII, No. 6, November-December 1979, pp.
4-21.
Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense; Subj : B-l DSARC
III Decision, no date, circa 1976, 4 pp.
Dunn, Keith A. , "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination
Thought: Strategy," Conflict Termination and Military
Strategy , Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, Eds., Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, pp. 175-193.
Dunn, Keith A. and William O. Staudenmaier, "Strategy For
Survival," Foreign Policy , No. 52, Fall 1983, pp. 22-41.
Dupuy, Trevor N. , "Military Reform: The Case for a Centralized
Command," Washington Post , June 9, 1984, p. 19.
113
Dutton, Jane E. and Robert B. Duncan, "The Influence of the
Strategic Planning Process on Strategic Change/' Strategic
Managment Journal , Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 1987, pp. 103-116.
Earle, Edward M. , Ed. Makers of Modern Strategy , Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1943, 553 pp.
Englund, Jon, "The Doctrine of 'Competitive Strategies',"
Strategic Review , Vol. XV, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 63-73.
Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?
Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969 , New York, New York:
Harper Colophon Books, 1972, 364 pp.
Erickson, Tamara J. and Lawrence M. Brenkus, Health Care R&D:
Targets and Tactics , DR870601, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Arthur
D. Little Decision Resources, June 1987, 100 pp.
Etzold, Thomas H. , "Being Right Too Soon," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , Vol. 109, No. 1, January 1983, pp. 57-61.
Etzold, Thomas H. and John L. Gaddis, Eds., Containment:
Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 , New York,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1978, 449 pp.
Fehner, Terrence R. , National Responses to Technological
Innovations in Weapons Systems, 1815 to the Present
,
Germantown, Maryland: History Associates, Inc., 7 January 1986,
79 pp.
Ferkiss, Victor C, Futurology: Promise, Performance, Prospects
,
The Washington Papers, Vol. 50, Beverly Hills, California: Sage
Publications, Inc., Published in Cooperation with The Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown university,
1979, 66 pp.
Foster, James L., "Defense Strategic Planning: An Approach,"
unpublished paper, attached to letter of May 4, 1981, 15 pp.
Foster, James L. , "Planning for the Long-Term Competition,"
Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, unpublished
paper, August 1979, 12 pp.
Fowles, Jib, Ed., Handbook of Futures Research , Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc. 1978, 822 pp.
Frank, Jerome D. and John C. Rivard, "Antinuclear Admirals--An
Interview Study," Political Psychology , Vol. 7, No. 1, 1986,
pp . 2 3-52.
Friedberg, Aaron L., "Memorandum for the Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy; Subj : Analysis of Past Planning Efforts,"
July 29, 1987, 24 pp.
114
Friedman, Milton, "The Meaning of Freedom/' Parameters , Vol. XV,
No. 3, Autumn 1985, pp. 2-6.
Friedman, Norman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Design of the
U.S. Fleet," Comparative Strategy , Vol. 6, No. 4, 1987, pp.
415-435.
Gaddis, John L. , The Long Peace; Inguiries into the History of
the Cold War , New York, New York/Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987, 332 pp.
Galdorisi, George V., "Long Range Planning for America's National
Security Strategy," unpublished paper, no date, circa Spring
1988, 54 pp.
General Accounting Office, "Briefing Report to the Honorable John
Heinz, U.S. Senate -- Industrial Base: Defense-Critical
Industries," GAO/NSIAD-88-192BR, Washington, D.C., August 1988,
49 pp.
George, James L. , Robert E. Sheridan, Francis J. West, and
Michael E. Sherman, Review of USN Long-Range Planning , CRM 85-
69, Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1985,
96 pp.
Georgoff, Daniel M. and Robert G. Murdick, "Manager's Guide to
Forecasting," Harvard Business Review , Vol. 64, No. 1, January-
February 1986, pp. 110-120.
Gero, Anthony G. , Precious Metals: A Guide to Trading and
Investing , Seacaucus, New Jersey: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1985, 150
pp.
Giessler, Frederick W. , "Competitive Strategies/Long Term
Competition," unpublished paper, Summer 1986, 2 pp.
Giessler, Frederick W. , "Memorandum for the Record; Subj
:
Strategic Planning Implementation," 30 April 1981, 2 pp.
Giessler, Frederick W. and William Eastman, "Readings on: Long
Term Competition, Strategic Planning, Competitive Strategies,"
unpublished paper, SAIC, May 1988, 2 pp.
Givens, William L. and Rapp, William V., "What It Takes To Meet
the Japanese Challenge," Fortune , Vol 99, No. 11, June 1979,
pp. 104-120.
Gorbachev, Mikhail, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and
the World , New York, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987,
254 pp.
Gordon, G. A. H. , British Seapower and Procurement Between the
Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament , Annapolis, Maryland: Naval
Institute Press, 1988, 321 pp.
115
Gorman, Paul F., Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World
Conflict , Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group
submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,
Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, June 1988, 87 pp.
Gorman, Paul F. , Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a
U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World , A Paper by the
Regional Conflict Working Group submitted to the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon,
May 1988, 59 pp.
Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of Super Power, Lexington,
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988, 274 pp.
Gray, Colin S. , "International Order and American Power," Air
University Review , Vol. XXXV, No. 6, September-October 1984,
pp. 26-34.
Gray, Colin S., "The Maritime Strategy and Competitive
Strategies," unpublished paper, November 1988, 18 pp.
Gray, Colin S., "Planning for U.S. Security Interests," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 110, No. 12, December 1984,
pp. 37-43.
Gray, Daniel H. , "Uses and Misuses of Strategic Planning,"
Harvard Business Review , Vol. 64, No. 1, January-February 1986,
pp. 89-97.
Gromyko, Anatoly, et. al., Eds., Breakthrough : Emerging New
Thinking -- Soviet and Western Scholars Issue a Challenge to
Build a World Beyond War , New York, New York: Walker and
Company, 1988, 281 pp.
Gropman, Alan, "Continuities: The United States Air Force of
2005," unpublished paper, Washington, D.C.: SYSCON Corporation,
no date, 41 pp.
Gropman, Alan, "Long-Range Planning: A New Beginning," The
Air University Review , Vol. XXXI, No. 1, November-December
1979, pp 49-54.
Guertner, Gary L. , "Competitive Strategies and Soviet
Vulnerabilities," unpublished paper, no date, circa 1987, 23 pp.
Hadley, Arthur T. , "The Split Military Psyche," New York Times
Magazine , July 13, 1986, pp. 26-33.
Hadley, Arthur T. , The Straw Giant: Triumph and Failure
—
America' s Armed Forces , New York, New York: Random House, 1986,
pp. 67-72.
116
Haendel, Dan, Corporate Strategic Planning; The Political
Dimension , The Washington Papers, No. 86, Beverly Hills/London:
Sage Publications, Inc., in cooperation with The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University,
1981, 88 pp.
Hafey, John R. , "A Theory of Naval Strategic Planning," Masters
Thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June
1988, 110 pp.
Haig, Alexander M. , Jr., "A Strategic Approach to American
Foreign Policy," address before the American Bar Association in
New Orleans, August 11, 1981, reprinted at Current Policy No.
305, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Halloran, Richard, "Army's 30-Year Plan Budgets Modestly," New
York Times, April 26, 1988, p. 18.
Hamermesh, Richard G. , "Forces Shaping Strategic Decision
Making," Making Strategy Work , New York, New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1986, pp. 50-63.
Hammond, Paul Y. , "Disincentives for the Development of National
Strategy: The Executive Branch," unpublished paper, December
1988, 23 pp.
Hammond, Paul Y. , "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers:
Appropriations, Strategy and Politics", American Civil-Military
Decisions: A Book of Case Studies , Harold Stein, Ed.
,
Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, in
cooperation with the Inter-University Case Study Program, 1963,
pp. 468-567.
Handel, Michael I., "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology,"
Journal of Strategic Studies , Vol. 9, Nos. 2 & 3,
June/September 1986, pp. 51-92.
Hansen, Roger D. , "The Reagan Doctrine and Global Containment:
Revival or Recessional," SAIS Review , Vol. 7, No. 1, Winter-
Spring 1987, pp. 39-66.
Hardisty, H. , "Memorandum for Distribution; Subj : Strategic Think
Tank," Ser 09/7U301267A, November 24, 1987, 3 pp.
Hardisty, H. , "OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5000 - Subj: LONG-RANGE
PLANNING," Ser 09/8U500878 OP-00K, Narch 24, 1988, 8 pp.
Harris, R. Robinson and James W. Montgomery, "Long Range Planning
for the Environment Circa 2000," Naval War College Review , Vol.
XXXII, No. 4, July-August 1984, pp. 63-71.
Hart, B. H. Liddell, Strategy , 2nd Ed., New York, New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1967, 430 pp.
117
Hartmann, Frederick H. , The Relations of Nations , 4th Ed. , New
York, New York: The Macmillan Co. , 715 pp.
Hartmann, Frederick H. and Robert L. Wendzel, Defending America'
s
Security , Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey' s International
Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988, 363 pp.
Hawes, John H. , "Improving the Balance of Conventional Forces in
Europe," address before a National Defense University symposium
entitled "The Future of Conventional Defense Improvements in
NATO," March 27, 1987, reprinted as Current Policy No. 939,
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Hayden, Catherine, The Handbook of Strategic Expertise , New York,
New York: The Free Press, 1986, 375 pp.
Helmer, Olaf , Looking Forward: A Guide to Futures Research
,
Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1983, 376 pp.
Hendrickson, David C, The Future of American Strategy , New York,
New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1987, 210 pp.
Heskett, James L., "Logistics Essential to Strategy," Survival
Strategies for American Industry , Alan M. Kantrow, Ed., New
York, New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1984, pp. 269-288.
Heymann, Philip B., The Politics of Public Management , New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987, 196 pp.
Heyns, Terry L., Ed., Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader
,
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983, 408
pp.
Hines, John G. and George F. Kraus, "Soviet Strategies for
Military Competition," Parameters , Vol. XVI, No. 3, Autumn
1986, pp. 26-31.
Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Education System 1943-
1986 , Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, March 1988, 59 pp.
Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Role and Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Chronology ,
Washington, D.C., The Pentagon, January 1987, 296 pp.
"History of Long-Range Planning in the Navy: 1900-present,
"
unpublished paper, no date, circa 1987, 23 pp.
Holloway, James L. , III, "A U.S. Military Strategy Into the Next
Century," Wings of Gold , Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1988, pp. 22-
26.
118
Hone, Thomas C. and Mark D. Mandeles, "Interwar Innovation in the
Three Navies: U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, Imperial Japanese Navy,"
Naval War College Review , Vol. XXXX, No. 2, Spring 1987, pp.
63-83.
Horwitch, Mel, Clipped Wings: The American SST Conflict
,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1982, 473 pp.
Hosmer, LaRue T. , "Introduction to Strategic Management,"
Strategic Management : Text and Cases on Business Policy
,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982, pp. 1-
34.
Howard, Michael, "The Influence of Clausewitz," On War , Ed. and
trans, by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 27-44.
Howard, Michael, Karl Kaiser, and Francois de Rose, "Deterrence
Policy: A European Response," International Herald Tribune
,
February 4, 1988.
Hull, Andrew W. , "Cost Imposing Strategies," draft report,
Arlington, Virginia: BETAC Corporation, July 15, 1983, 54 pp.
Hussey, David E., Ed., The Truth About Corporate Planning:
International Research into the Practice of Planning , Elmsford,
New York: Pergamon Press, 1983, 586 pp.
Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett, "Deterrence, Failure and Crisis
Escalation", International Studies Quarterly , Vol. 32, No. 1,
March 1988, pp. 30-45.
Ikle, Fred C, "The Idol of Stability," The National Interest ,
Winter 1986/87, pp. 75-79.
Ikle, Fred C. and Albert Wohlstetter, "Discriminate Deterrence:
Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,"
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 January
1988, 69 pp.
JCS Reform: Proceedings of the Conference , Newport, Rhode Island:
Naval War College, no date, proceedings of conference held May
6-7, 1985, 106 pp.
Johnson, Robert H. , "Periods of Peril: The Window of
Vulnerability and Other Myths," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 61, No.
4, Spring 1983, pp. 950-970.
Jones, David C, "What's Wrong with our Defense Establishment,"
New York Times Magazine , November 7, 1982, pp. 38, 41-42, 70,
73-75, 78-83.
Jones, Thomas E. , Options for the Future: A Comparative Analysis
of Policy-Oriented Forecasts , New York, New York: Praeger,
1980, 348 pp.
119
Keiser, Gordon W. , The U.S. Marine Corps and Defense Unification
1944-47; The Politics of Survival , Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 1982, 172 pp.
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers : Economic
Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 , New York, New
York: Random House, 1987, 677 pp.
Kent, Glenn A., "Concepts of Operations: A More Coherent
Framework For Defense Planning," N-2026-AF, Santa Monica,
California: The RAND Corporation, August 1983, 31 pp.
Kester, John G. , "Armed Forces For What?" Military Logistics
Forum , Vol. 2, No. 2, September 1985, pp. 9-10.
King, James E. , "On Clausewitz: Master Theorist of War", Naval
War College Review , Vol. XXX, No. 2, Fall 1977, pp. 3-36.
Kissinger, Henry A., "First, Coherent Policy," New York Times
,
January 18, 1982, p. 21.
Kissinger, Henry A., "Trading With the Russians," New Republic ,
Vol. 186, No. 22, June 2, 1982, pp. 14-16.
Kloske, Dennis E., "Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of
Defense; Subj : Competitive Strategies Update--INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM," April 19, 1988, 1 p. with 26 slides.
Kloske, Dennis E., Statement before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services, April 11, 1988, stenographic transcript, 14 pp., plus
transcript of questions and answers.
Knorr, Klaus and Oskar Morgenstern, "Political Conjecture in
Military Planning," Princeton, New Jersey: Center of
International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University, Policy Memorandum
No. 35, November 1968, 56 pp.
Kolkowicz, Roman, "The Soviet Union: The Elusive Adversary," The
Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War , Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P.
Mickiewicz, Eds., Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,
1986, pp. 1-24.
Kotter, John P., The General Managers , New York, New York: The
Free Press, 1982, 221 pp.
Kotz, Nick, Nancy B. Nathan, and Cathryn Donohoe, "Where Have all
the Warriors Gone?" The Washingtonian , July 1984, pp. 80-85,
126-130, 132, 134-135.
Kronenberg, Philip S., Ed., Planning U.S. Security , Washington,
D. C: National Defense University Press, 1981, 214 pp.
120
Krulak, Victor H. , Organization for National Security: A Study
,
Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1983, 141
pp.
Lambeth, Benjamin S., "Contemporary Soviet Military Policy," The
Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P.
Mickiewicz, Eds., Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,
1986, pp. 25-48.
Lebow, Richard Ned, "Windows of Opportunity Do States Jump
Through Them?," International Security , Vol. 9, No. 1, Summer
1984, pp. 147-186.
Lehman, John, "Don't Subject Pentagon to Trendy Whims," Miami
Herald , July 29, 1985, p. 11.
Lehman, John, "Let's Stop Trying to be Prussians," Washington
Post , June 10, 1984, p. C7
.
Levine, Robert A. , The Arms Debate and the Third World: Have We
Learned From Vietnam? , R-3523-FF/CC/RC, Santa Monica,
California: The RAND Corporation, May 1987, 91 pp.
Libicki, Martin C, Industrial Strength Defense: A Disquisition
on Manufacturing , Surge and War , Washington, D.C.: Mobilization
Concepts Development Center, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, no date, 164 pp.
Lind, William S., "Prussia Has Little to do With It," Washington
Post , June 24, 1984, p. B7
Lindsay, James M. , "Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-
examination," International Studies Quarterly , Vol. 30, No. 2,
June 1986, pp. 154-173.
Little, Arthur D. , The Strategic Management of Technology ,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Arthur D. Little Inc., final printing
of material originally presented at the 1981 European
Management Forum in Davos, 39 pp.
Locher, James R. , III, Defense Organization: The Need for Change ,
Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Committee Print 99-86,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 16,
1985, 645 pp.
Lorange, Peter and Vancil, Richard F. , Strategic Planning
Systems , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1977, 364 pp.
Lunsford, Richard J., Jr., "Defense Planning: A Time For
Breadth," Parameters , Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1978, pp. 15-25.
121
Luttwak, Edward N. , The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From
the First Century A.D. to the Third , Baltimore, Maryland: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1979, 255 pp.
Luttwak, Edward N. , Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace
,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belnap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1987, 283 pp.
Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Managing the Public ' s Business: The Job
of the Government Executive , New York, New York: Basic Books,
Inc. , 1981, 211 pp.
Lynn, William J. and Barry Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform,"
International Security , Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1985/86, pp.
69-97.
McNamara, Robert S. , Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the
First Century of the Nuclear Age , New York, New York: Pantheon
Books, 1986, 212 pp.
Makeyev, B. , "Some Views on the Theory of Naval Weaponry,"
Morskoy Sbornik, No. 4, 1982, pp. 27-31.
Maness, Anthony R. , "Building a National Strategy," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 114, No. 6, June 1988, pp. 103-106.
Mann, Paul, "Competitive Strategies Doctrine Pushed by Defense
Dept. for Post-INF Planning," Aviation Week & Space Technology
,
February 1, 1988, pp. 25 & 29.
Mann, Paul, "Strategic Doctrine for High Technology," Aviation
Week and Space Technology , June 15, 1987, pp. 110-114.
Mann, Paul, "Thinking Strategically," Aviation Week and Space
Technology , July 6, 1987, p. 13.
Mark, Hans, "Memorandum for John A. Hewitt, Jr., SAF/FM; Subj
:
Long-Range Planning," Office of the Under Secretary of the Air
Force, February 26, 1979.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Competitive Strategies: History and
Background," unpublished paper, March 3, 1988, 13 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of
Defense; Subj: How to Organize for Strategic Planning," April
6, 1981, 4 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Robert Ellsworth, Subj: The
Role of the Second Deputy," January 1977, 4 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Fred Ikle; Subj:
Implementation Plan for Strategic Planning Group," May 13,
1981, 3 pp.
122
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Fred Ikle; Subj : Insuring
Implementation of Policy Changes/' April 9, 1981, 13 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W.
, "Memorandum for Fred Ikle; Subj: Options for
the Organization of Strategic Planning," April 23, 1981, 4 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Fred Ikle; Subj: Starting Up
Strategic Planning Effort," June 11, 1981, 2 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Ambassador Robert Komer;
Subj: Sources of People for Strategic Planning," August 19,
1980, 2 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Hans Mark; Subj: Strategic
Planning," Spring 1979, 3 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Vincent Puritano; Subj:
Organizing for Strategic Planning," May 12, 1981, 6 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense;
Subj: Strategic Planning in Defense," April 1, 1977, 2 pp.
Marshall, Andrews W. , "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense;
Subj: Thinking About the Navy," March 1, 1976, 12 pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. , "Memorandum for Walter Slocombe; Subj:
Strategic Planning and Power Projection, January 14, 1980, 5
pp.
Marshall, Andrew W. and Charles Wolf, Sources of Change in the
Future Security Environment , A Paper by the Future Security
Environment Working Group, submitted to the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon,
April 1988, 29 pp.
Martin, James J., J. Miller, and J. Thompson, "A Model of the
U.S. /Soviet Military Competition," SAIC, briefing slides dated
April 1, 1987, 54 slides.
Miller, Edward S., "The Plan and the Planners," War Plan Orange ,
draft, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988.
Millett, Allan R. , William Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, "The
Effectiveness of Military Organizations," International
Security , Vol. 11, No. 1, Summer 1986, pp. 37-71.
Mintzberg, Henry, "Crafting Strategy," Harvard Business Review ,
July-August 1987, pp. 66-75.
Montgomery, R. A. , "B-52--A Case Study for Military Competition
with the Soviet Union," Montgomery and Associates, June 24,
1987, 35 pp.
Morrison, David C, "The Rush to Fill a Strategy Vacuum,"
National Journal , July 11, 1987, pp. 1802-1803.
123
Morton, Louis, "The Beginnings of Pacific Strategy," Strategy and
Command : The First Two Years -- United States Army in World War
II: The War in the Pacific , Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1962, pp.
21-44.
Moses, Louis J., The Call for JCS Reform: Crucial Issues
,
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985, 61
pp.
Mossberg, Walter S. and John Wakcott, "Strategic Shift: U.S.
Redefines Policy on Security to Place Less Stress on Soviets,"
The Wall Street Journal , August 11, 1988, p. 1.
Narchal, R. M. , K. Kittappa, and P. Bhattacharya, "An
Environmental Scanning System for Business Planning," Long
Range Planning , Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 96-105.
National Defense University, Research Directorate, Jointly with
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Defense Advanced
Projects Agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the Institute for the Future, Crop Yields
and Climate Change to the Year 2000, Report on the Second Phase
of a Climate Impact Assessment , Vol. I, Washington, D.C.,
National Defense University, 1980, 128 pp.
"The Navy/Marine Corps Future," unpublished paper dated December
21, 1987, 8 pp.
Nelson, Richard R. and Sidney G. Winter, "Schumpeterian
Competition," An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
,
Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1982, pp. 275-351.
"The New Breed of Strategic Planner," Businessweek , September 17,
1984, pp. 62-68.
Nicholls, David, "Long-Term Defense Planning," NATO ' s : Fifteen
Nations , Vol. 26, No. 2, April-May 1981, pp. 26-32.
Nixon, Richard, The Real War , New York, New York: Warner Books,
1981, 366 pp.
Nixon, Richard, 1999: Victory Without War , New York, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1988, 336 pp.
Norris, David T. , "Strategic Planning, Polaris, and Tomahawk:
Technological Imperative Hypothesis," Masters Thesis, Monterey,
California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1987, 126 pp.
Nunn, Sam, "It's Not What We Spend on Defense," Washington Post ,
June 4, 1985, p. 17.
124
Nye, Joseph S. , Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale,
Eds., Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe , Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988, 294 pp.
Oberdorfer, Don, "Kennan Urges Basic Policy Shift," Washington
Post , May 18, 1983, p. 12.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, First Annual Long-Range
Planners ' Conference , Report of conference at Annapolis,
Maryland, September 17-18, 1985, 51 pp.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Maritime Balance
Study: The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment- -Executive
Summary , Washington, D.C., April 15, 1979, 17 pp.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Themes and Issues of
the Second Annual Navy Long Range Planners' Conference," and
reports on Working Groups on Naval Warfare Frontiers, Strategy,
and Warfighting and Operational Concepts, no date, circa 1986,
20 pp.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Team, Reassessment of
Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities , Washington, D.C.
:
The Pentagon, October 1987.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Study Team, Management Study
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense , Washington, D.C.
The Pentagon, October 1987.
Ohmae, Kenichi, The Mind of the Strategist: Business Planning for
Competitive Advantage , New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1982, 283 pp.
Oliva, Terence A., Diana L. Day, and Wayne S. DeSarbo, "Selecting
Competitive Tactics: Try a Strategy Map," Sloan Management
Review , Vol. 28, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 5-15.
Paine, Frank T. and Carl R. Anderson, Strategic Management ,
Chicago, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1983, 392 pp.
Paret, Peter, "The Genesis of On War," On War , Ed. and trans, by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 3-25.
Paret, Peter, Ed. , Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to
the Nuclear Age , Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1986, 941 pp.
Paul, Ronald N. , Neil B. Donavan, and James W. Taylor, "The
Reality Gap in Strategic Planning," Harvard Business Review ,
Vol. 56, No. 3, May-June 1978, pp. 124-130.
125
Petersen, John L., "Thoughts on Using the Business Model and
Structural Device for Encouraging an Active Competitive Mind
Set in the Department of Defense," unpublished paper,
May 1985, 5 pp.
Phillips, Thomas R. , Ed., Roots of Strategy: The 5_ Greatest
Military Classics of All Time , Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:
Stackpole Books, 1985, 448 pp.
Pickett, George E. , Jr., "AIRLAND Battle, Helicopters and Tanks:
Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation," unpublished paper,
no date, circa November 1988, 17 pp.
Pickett, George E., Jr., "The High Stakes Game of Competitive
Strategies," Army , November 1988, pp. 23-25.
Pickett, George E. , Jr., "Strategic Thought: The Weak Link,"
Army , April 1981, pp. 19-22.
Pickett, George E., Jr., "Time for a Defense Strategy,"
unpublished paper, no date, circa 1981, 33 pp.
Pipes, Richard, "Will Sanctions Sway the Soviets?" interview in
U.S. News & World Report , October 11, 1982, pp. 27-28.
Podhoretz, Norman, "Appeasement By Any Other Name," Commentary
,
Vol. 76, No. 1, July 1983, pp. 25-38.
Poindexter, John M. , "Regional Security, Collective Security, and
American Security," address before the 1986 Armed Forces Day
dinner at the Chamber of Commerce, Indianapolis, Indiana, May
16, 1986, reprinted as Current Policy No. 838, U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Porter, Michael E., Cases in Competitive Strategy , New York, New
York: Free Press, 1983, 541 pp.
Porter, Michael E. , Competitive Advantage : Creating and
Sustaining Superior Performance , New York, New York: The Free
Press, 1985, 557 pp.
Porter, Michael E. , Competitive Strategy: Technigues for
Analyzing Industries and Competitors , New York, New York: The
Free Press, 1980, 396 pp.
Quinn, James B., Strategies for Change : Logical Incrementalism
Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 1980, 222 pp.
Quinlan, Robert J., "The United States Fleet: Diplomacy, Strategy
and the Allocation of Ships (1940-1941)," American Civil-
Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies , Harold Stein, Ed.,
Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, in
cooperation with the Inter-University Case Study Program, 1963,
pp. 155- 201.
126
Radford, K. J., "Strategic Planning," unpublished paper, November
1978, 11 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "Agenda for Peace," address before the Second
United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament,
June 17, 1982, reprinted in Current Policy No. 405, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "The Agenda of U.S. -Soviet Relations," address to
the Corps of Cadets of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point,
October 28, 1987, reprinted as Current Policy No. 1021, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "A Foundation for Enduring Peace," address before
the United Nations General Assembly at the commemoration of the
40th anniversary of the United Nations, New York, October 21,
1985, reprinted as Current Policy No. 756, U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "The Geneva Summit: A Fresh Start," address
before the Joint session of Congress, November 21, 1985,
reprinted as Current Policy No. 766, U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, 3 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "A Mission for Peace," address to the nation,
November 14, 1985, reprinted as Current Policy No. 765, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 3 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States
,
Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1987, 41 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, National Security Strategy of the United States ,
Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1988, 41 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "Progress in the Quest for Peace and Freedom,"
Address before the American Legion, Washington, D.C., February
22, 1983, reprinted as Current Policy No. 455, U.S. Department
of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 5 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, "Promoting Democracy and Peace," address before
the British Parliament, June 8, 1982, reprinted in Current
Policy No. 399, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, 5 pp.
Reagan, Ronald, transcript of news conference on foreign and
domestic matters, New York Times , January 21, 1983, p. 14.
Reagan, Ronald, "You Buried Animosity and Hatred in the Rubble,"
Washington Post , May 9, 1985, p. 28, transcript of speech to
European Parliament in Strasbourg, May 8, 1985.
127
Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Hearings
Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2nd
Sess., HASC No. 97-47, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1982, 1002 pp.
Ries, Al and Jack Trout, Marketing Warfare , New York, New York:
McGraw-Hill, Inc., November 1986, 215 pp.
Riggle, Gordon G. , "Looking to the Long Run," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 106, No. 9, September 1980, pp. 60-
65.
Roberts, Nancy and Paula J. King, "Stakeholder Audit: A
Commissioner's Tool for Transformation," unpublished paper,
January 1987, 30 pp.
Roche, James G. , "Strategy for Competing with the Soviets in the
Military Sector of the Continuing Political-Military
Competition," unpublished paper produced in the Office of the
Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
26 July 1976, 37 pp.
Roehm, David, "Strategic Planning Concept Paper," prepared for
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, Personnel, and
Training, June 25, 1979, 40 pp.
Rood, Harold, Kingdoms of the Blind: How the Great Democracies
Have Resumed the Follies That So Nearly Cost Them Their Life
,
Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980, 294 pp.
Roots of Strategy: Book 2_, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole
Books, 1987, 557 pp.
Schecter, Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, "The War Planners,"
Esquire , January 1983, pp. 63-70, & 72-73.
Schelling, Thomas C, The Strategy of Conflict , Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980, 309 pp.
Schlesinger, James, "The Eagle and the Bear: Ruminations on Forty
Years of Superpower Relations," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 63, No.
5, Summer 1985, pp. 937-961.
"Sea Pan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study—UNCLASSIFIED Executive
Summary," 1978, 22 pp.
Seeley, Mark T. , "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act
of 1986: Genesis and Postscript," Masters Thesis, Monterey,
California: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1987, 70 pp.
Seidman, Harold and Robert Gilmour, Politics, Position, and
Power : From the Positive to the Regulatory State , 4th Ed. , New
York, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 370 pp.
128
Shelton, Michael W. , "Plan Orange Revisited," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings , Vol. 110, No. 12, December 1984, pp. 50-
56.
Shultz, George, "America and the Struggle For Freedom," address
before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco,
February 22, 1985, reprinted as Current Policy No. 659, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 5 pp.
Shultz, George, "The Ecology of International Change," address
before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco,
October 28, 1988, reprinted as Current Policy No. 1120, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 4 pp.
Shultz, George, "Exerpts From Speech By Shultz," New York Times,
December 10, 1984, p. 11, excerpts from address at Yeshiva
University convocation at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in
Manhattan on December 9, 1984.
Shultz, George, "Foreign Aid and U.S. National Interests,"
address before the Southern Center for International Studies,
Atlanta, Georgia, February 24, 1983, reprinted as Current
Policy No. 457, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, 4 pp.
Shultz, George, "The Future of American Foreign Policy: New
Realities and New Ways of Thinking," address before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, January 31, 1985, reprinted as
Current Policy No. 650, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, 8 pp.
Shultz, George, "Managing the U.S. -Soviet Relationship," address
before the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies,
Seattle, February 5, 1988, reprinted as Current Policy No.
1043, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 6 pp.
Shultz, George, "Managing the U.S. -Soviet Relationship Over the
Long Term," address before the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study
of Soviet International Behavior, Los Angeles, October 18,
1984, reprinted as Current Policy No. 624, U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 5 pp.
Shultz, George, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," Foreign
Affairs , Vol. 63, No. 4, Spring 1985, pp. 705-721.
Shultz, George, "Security and Economic Assistance for FY 1984,"
remarks made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 16, 1983, reprinted as Current Policy No. 454, U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 8 pp.
Shultz, George, "U.S. -Soviet Relations in the Context of U.S.
Foreign Policy," address before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, June 17, 1983, reprinted as Current Policy No. 492,
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of public Affairs, 7 pp.
129
Simons, W. E. , G. K. Smith, E. S. Ojdana, Jr., R. Y. Pei, S. W.
Purnell, and E. S. Wainstein, Long-Range Development Planning
in the Air Force , R-1989-PR, Santa Monica, California: The RAND
Corporation, September 1976, 131 pp.
Siomkos, George and Paul Shrivastava, "Strategies for Declining
Businesses—Survival in the Fur Business," Long Range Planning
,
Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 84-95.
Skelton, Ike, "We're Not Trying to be Prussians," Washington
Post , June 16, 1984, p. 13.
Smith, Perry M. , "Developing a Long-Term National Strategy:
Shifting Imperatives," unpublished paper, December 1988, 24 pp.
Smith, Perry M., Jerrold P. Allen, John H. Stewart II, and F.
Douglas Whitehouse, Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range
Planning for National Security , Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, July 1987, 133 pp.
Smyrl, Marc E. , Conflict or Codetermination? Congress, the
President, and the Power to Make War, Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988, 180 pp.
Spanier, John, Games Nations Play: Analyzing International
Politics , New York, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972, 457 pp.
Spector, Ronald, H. , "Orange," Eagle Against the Sun , New York,
New York: The Free Press, 1985, pp. 54-69.
Steiner, George A. , Strategic Planning: What Every Manager Must
Know , New York/London, The Free Press, 1979, 383 pp.
Stetson, John C, "Broadening the Strategic Planning Process,"
Air Force Magazine , Vol. 62, No. 5, May 1979, pp. 58-59.
Stonich, Paul J., Ed., Implementing Strategy: Making Strategy
Happen , Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1982, 177 pp.
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, An Approach
to Long-Range Strategic Planning , Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania: October 15, 1973, 12 pp.
Summers, Harry G. , Jr., "Preparedness Depends on War-Savvy
Officers," The Wall Street Journal , August 3, 1984, p. 16.
Summers, Harry G. , Jr., "A Strategic Perception of the Vietnam
War," Parameters , Vol. XIII, No. 2, June 1983, pp. 41-46.
Taylor, Maxwell D. , "That $757.6 Billion Budget: How to Find
Out How Much we Need for Defense," Washington Post , 7 March
1982, p. C8.
130
Taylor, Maxwell D. , The Uncertain Trumpet , New York, New York:
Harper and Bros., Pubs., 1960, 203 pp.
Thibault, George E., Ed., The Art and Practice of Military
Strategy , Washington, D. C: National Defense University, 1984,
883 pp.
Thompson, Arthur A., Jr. and A. J. Strickland III, Strategy
Formulation and Implementation : Tasks of the General Manager
,
3rd Ed., Piano, Texas: Business Publications, Inc., 1986, 452
pp.
Thompson, William R. and Gary Zuk, "World Power and the Struggle
Trap of Territorial Commitments," International Studies
Quarterly , Vol. 30, No. 3, September 1986, pp. 249-267.
Thorpe, George C, Pure Logistics: The Science of War
Preparation , Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, 1986, 117 pp.
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War , Rex Warner, trans.,
New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1972, 648 pp.
Toth, Robert C, "Economic Sgueeze of Soviets Ordered," Los
Angeles Times , March 16, 1983, pp. 1 & 20.
Trainor, Bernard E., "Another U.S. Study Down the Drain?" New
York Times , January 13, 1988, p. 16.
Tritten, James J. and Nancy C. Roberts, Eds., "Student Reports in
Strategic Planning," NPS-56-88-031PR, Monterey, California:
Naval Postgraduate School, September 1988, 301 pp.
Trofimenko, Genrikh, The U.S. Military Doctrine , Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1986, 222 pp.
Tzu, Sun, The Art of War , Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London,
England: Oxford University Press, 1971, 197 pp.
Ulam, Adam B. , "How to Restrain the Soviets," Commentary , Vol.
70, No. 6, December 1980, pp. 38-41.
Valley, Bruce, "Future Vision: The Case for Long Range Planning,"
unpublished paper, June 1987., 4 pp.
Van Cleave, William, "A Collective Reaction to the Brezhnev
Doctrine", International Security and the Brezhnev Doctrine ,
New York, New York: CAUSA Publications, July 1985, reprint of
paper presented at an International Security Council conference
in Brussels, June 9-11, 1985, pp. 17-26.
van Gunsteren, Lex A. , "Planning for Technology as a Corporate
Resource: a Strategic Classification," Long Range Planning ,
Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 51-60.
131
Vlahos, Michael, "The End of America's Postwar Ethos," Foreign
Affairs , Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, pp. 1091-1107.
Vroom, Victor H. and Arthur G. Jago, The New Leadership: Managing
Participation in Organizations , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1988, 244 pp.
Wade, James P., Jr., "Memorandum for Mr. Richard Godwin; Subj
:
Competitive Strategies," September 24, 1986, 3 pp.
Walt, Stephan M. , "The Search for a Science of Strategy,"
International Security , Vol. 12, No. 1, Summer 1987, pp. 140-
165 (Review essay on Makers of Modern Strategy )
.
Webb, James H. , Jr., remarks to the National Press Club,
Washington, D.C., January 13, 1988, transcript, 15 pp.
Webb, James H. , Jr., "U.S. Military: Strength Through
Flexibility," The Wall Street Journal , January 18, 1988, p. 12.
Weinberger, Caspar, W. Annual Report to the Congress --Fiscal year
1987
,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1986, pp. 73-88.
Weinberger, Caspar, W. Annual Report to the Congress --Fiscal year
1988
,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1987, pp. 65-69.
Weinberger, Caspar W. , "Continuity and Change in American
Strategy," remarks prepared for delivery at the National
Defense Forum, National Defense University Ft. McNair, July 29,
1986, 5 pp. (OASD/PA press release No. 364-86).
Weinberger, Caspar W. , Statement before Senate Committee on
Armed Services hearings on U.S. National Security Strategy,
January 12, 1987, mimeograph, 16 pp.
Weinberger, Caspar W. , "The Use of Force and the National Will,"
Baltimore Sun , December 3, 1984, p. 11, adapted from speech at
the National Press Club on November 28, 1984.
Weinberger, Casper W. , "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs ,
Vol. 64, No. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 694-697.
Weiss, Seymour, "The NSC is no Place for Active Military
Officers," The Wall Street Journal , February 4, 1987, p. 30.
Wernerfelt, Birger and Aneel Karnani, "Research Notes and
Communications: Competitive Strategy Under Uncertainty,"
Strategic Management Journal , Vol. 8, No. 2, March-April 1987,
pp. 187-194.
132
Wheelen, Thomas L. and J. David Hunger, "Strategic
Implementation" and "Evaluation and Control," Strategic
Management and Business Policy , 2nd Ed., Reading,
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., August 1986, pp.
207-256.
Whitehead, John C, "The U.S. Approach to Eastern Europe: A Fresh
Look," address before the Washington Institute of Foreign
Affairs, January 19, 1988, 3 pp.
Whittaker, James B., Strategic Planning in a Rapidly Changing
Environment , Lexington, Massachusetts/Toronto: Lexington Books,
1978, 165 pp.
Wolfowitz, Paul, "Preserving Nuclear Peace in the 1980 's,"
address at the U.S. Naval War College, June 22, 1982, reprinted
in Current Policy No. 406, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, 6 pp.
Wolk, Herman S., "Revolt of the Admirals," Air Force Magazine ,
Vol. 71, No. 5, May 1988, pp. 62-67.
Wright, Peter, "A Refinement of Porter's Strategies," Strategic
Management Journal , Vol. 8, No. 1, 1987, pp. 93-101.
Young, John A., Chairman of the President's Commission on Industrial
Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality , Vol. I,
Washington, D.C., January 1985, 60 pp.
Young, John A., Chairman of the President's Commission on Industrial
Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality , Vol. II,
Washington, D.C., January 1985, 391 pp.
Zakheim, Dov S., "A Dearth of Strategic Thinkers," New York
Times, January 20, 1988, p. 23.
Zhurkin, Vitaliy V. , Sergey A. Karaganov, and Andrey V. Kortunov,





1. Dudley Knox Library 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100








Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20501




Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
5. CAPT Jerry Murphy, USN 2
Chief Strategic Planning
USD A PI/SP Room 3E10
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
6. COL Donald Snider, USA 2
Director, Defense Policy
OEB Room 308
National Security Council Staff
17 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20506
7. Dr. James J. Tritten 20
Commander, U.S. Navy
Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs (56)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
8. Dr. Nancy C. Roberts, Associate Professor 20
Administrative Science Department (54Rc)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
9. Dr. Darnell Whitt, Associate Professor 5





10. Dr. David Whipple 1
Chairman
Administrative Science Department (54)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
11. CAPT James Mueller, USN 17




(forward to students previously enrolled in NS 4230)
12. Dr. Ben Adams 1
Deputy Commissioner
U.S. -Soviet Standing Consultative Commission
Pentagon Room 5A670
Washington, D.C. 20301
13. Dr. Richard T. Ackley 1
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Director, Natiional Security Studies
California State University, San Bernardino
5500 University Parkway
San Bernardino, CA 92407
14. LTC Ken Allard, USA 1
DACS-ZBAS (Pnt Room 3C641
Office of the Chief of Staff
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310-0200
15. COL David J. Andre, USA 1
Special Assistant for Analysis
ODUSD (Planning and Resources)
Pentagon, Room 3A7&8
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301-2100
16. Clarence E. Armstrong 1




500 E. Orangethorpe Ave.
Anaheim, CA 92801
17. Dr. Roger Barnett 1






18. BG Harry H. Bendorf, USAF (Ret.)
Director, Washington D.C. Office
Boeing Helicopter Company
1700 N. Moore Street
Arlington, VA 22209




20. Jose M. Bestard
Director of Corporate Planning
Florida Power & Light Company
P.O. Box 029100
Miami, FL 33102
21. MAJ Robert M. Blum, USA
HQ TRADOC ATCG-P
Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000
22. Dr. John F. Brahtz
Code L03B
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory
Port Hueneme, CA 93043




8900 E. Washington Blvd.
Pico Rivera, CA 90660-3737
24. Dr. Phillip Butler












26. William M. Charles
Manager, Business Assessments
Strategy Planning and Analysis
Boeing Military Airplanes
P. O. Box 7730, MS K14-37
Wichita, KS 67277-7730
136





28. John Coan, Program Manager
National Defense Executive Reserve
HCHB room H8378




Beverly Hills, CA 90210
30. Seth Cropsey
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
(Special Reviews & Analysis)
Pnt Room 4E780
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20350
31. Dr. Donald C. Daniel
Chairman, Campaign and Strategy Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841-5010
32. Dr. Brad Dismukes
Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22301
33. Dr. Michael A. Freney
SECNAV Fellow
U. S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02841
34. Dr. Robert Friedheim
#4
6505 Esplanade
Playa del Rey, CA 90293
35. Erik M. Fromm
Manager, Strategic Planning
Boeing Aerospace
P. O. Box 3999, MS 84-22
Seattle, WA 98124-2499
36. Sarah W. Fuller, President




37. Ms. Devon Gaffney, Director of Research
The Smith Richardson Institute
210 East 86th Street
New York, NY 10028
38. Dr. Robert G. Gard, Jr.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
President
Monterey Institute of International Studies
425 Van Buren Street
Monterey, CA 93940
39. Dr. James George
Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22301
40. Anthony George Gero, Vice President
Prudential-Bache Securities Inc.
100 Gold Street
New York, NY 10292
41. Frederick Haag
P. O. Box 590
Ranch Santa Fe, CA 92067
42. Dr. David K. Hall
National Security Decision Making Department
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841
43. Dr. Paul Y. Hammond
Graduate School of Public & International Affairs
University of Pittsburg
Pittsburg, PA 15260
44. COL David G. Hansen, USA
Chairman
Department of National Security and Strategy
U.S. Army War College
Box 484
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050
45. Dr. Frederick Hartman
2060 Quartz Hill Place
Gold River, CA 95670
46. Dr. Richard Head
Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.)
Director of Advanced Planning
Washington Operations
SRS Technologies




47. COL John J. Hickey, Jr., USA
Attn: AWCI Root Hall Room A218
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013
48. J. Andrew Hutchison
Boeing Corporation
MS 8R-83
P. O. Box 3999
Seattle, WA 98124-2499
49. CAPT William S. Johnson, USN
OP-06A
Pentagon Room 4E592
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20301
50. Dr. Francis X. Kane
Strategic Defense Center
Rockwell International Corporation
2230 East Imperial Highway
El Segundo, CA 90245
51. COL Thomas A. Keaney, USAF
Chairman, Department of Strategy
National War College
Ft. Leslie J. McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319-6000





53. CDR John Kenny, USN
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
54. Dr. Steven Kime, Director
Captain, U.S. Navy
U. S. and International Studies




Falls Church, VA 22241
139
56. Raymond E. Kozen
Staff Vice President - Special Projects
General Dynamics Corporation
Suite 1000
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202
57. LTC Edward Lewis, USMC (Ret.)
2796 Alton Hotel Court
Woodbridge, VA 22192
58. Wallis M. Logan
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Program Manager, Space Based Radar




Seal Beach, CA 90740-7644
59. Cameron N. Lusty
7560 Bay Island Drive, #241
St. Petersburg, FL 33707
60. Dr. J. J. Martin
Senior Vice-President
Science Applications International Corp
10260 Campus Point Drive
San Diego, CA 92121
61. CAPT Michael Martus, USN
OP-603
Pentagon Room 4E486
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
62. Dr. Kleber S. Masterson
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Vice President - Booz Allen & Hamilton
Crystal Square #2, Suite 1100
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202-4158
63. Rodney B. McDaniel
Science Applications International Corp,
1300 Crystal Dr., #902
Arlington, VA 22202








65. Myra S. McKitrick
Corporate Manager - Special Projects
General Dynamics Corporation
Suite 1000
1745 Jefferson Davis Highway
Arlington, VA 22202
66. Dr. Jeffrey S. Milstein
Strategic Analyst and Planner
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Plans and Policy Directorate
Strategy Division
The Pentagon, Room 2E949
Washington, DC 20301
67. Ambler H. Moss, Jr.
Dean, Graduate School of International Studies
University of Miami
1531 Brescia Street
Coral Gables, FL 33124
68. CAPT Charles Pease, USN (Ret.)
United Technologies
1825 Eye Street, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20006
69. Robert E. Pendley
Associate Center Director
Center for National Security Studies
Mail Stop A112
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, NM 87545




71. George E. Pickett, Jr.
Northrop Analysis Center
2 Lafayette Centre
1133 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
72. Dr. Bruce Powers
Special Assistant for Technology, Plans, & Analysis
OP-05/50W Pnt Room 4E367








Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138
74. Dr. James Roche
Captain, U. S. Navy (Retired)
Northrop Analysis Center
2 Lafayette Centre
1133 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036




76. J. W. Russel
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Manager, Systems Analysis
Boeing Aerospace
P. O. Box 3999, 8R-83
Seattle, WA 98124-2499
77. Dr. Scott Sagan




78. CAPT Ronald C. St. Martin USN (Ret.)
Northrop Analysis Center
1133 21st St. , N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036




80. COL William M. Sheperd, USA
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
TRADOC
Fort Monroe, VA 23651
81. Dr. Perry Smith
Major General, U.S. Air Force (Ret.)
7217 Van Ness Court
McLean, VA 22101
142
82. Dr. Richard F. Staar
Coordinator
International Studies Program
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, CA 94305-6010
83. CAPT Peter Swartz, USN
USNATO/DoD
Box 102
APO New York, NY 09667-5028
84. Andrew Swire
The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
P.O. Box 71
Medford, MA 02155
85. Dr. Ronald J. Versic, President
Ronett T. Dodge Company
P. O. Box 9481
Dayton, OH 45409
86. Dr. Michael Vlahos
Director, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Service Institute
U.S. Department of State
1400 Key Blvd.
Arlington, VA 22209
87. LTC Barry Watts, USAF (Ret.)
Northrop Analysis Center
Suite 700, 2 Lafayette Centre
1133 - 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
88. CAPT Robert B. Watts, USN (Ret.)
Coordinator, Strategic Studies Project
Naval War College Foundation
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02841-5010
89. Larry K. Wentz
Technical Director




90. Francis J. West
The Gamma Corporation
1818 North Lynn Street, Suite 804
Arlington, VA 22209
143
91. Dr. Charles Wolf
Director, RAND Graduate School
RAND Corporation
P. 0. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90406-2130
92. Dr. Michael Yarymovych
Vice President and Associate Center Director
Strategic Defense Center
Rockwell International Corporation
2230 East Imperial Highway




3 2768 00340204 1
